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Warfare as Regulation
Robert Knowles*
Abstract
The United States government’s national security activities,
including the use of force, consume more than half of all federal
discretionary spending and are carried out by the world’s largest
bureaucracy. Yet existing scholarship treats these activities as
conduct to be regulated, rather than as forms of regulatory action.
This Article introduces a new paradigm for depicting what
agencies involved in national security do. It posits that, like other
agencies, the national security bureaucracy is best understood to
be engaging in regulatory activity—by targeting, detaining,
interrogating, and prosecuting enemies; patrolling the border; and
conducting surveillance and covert actions. Also, like other
agencies, this bureaucracy may overregulate—by using force or
conducting surveillance more aggressively than necessary to
achieve its objectives.
This
warfare-as-regulation
paradigm
offers
several
advantages over the predominant paradigm. It provides a cohesive
explanatory framework for recent trends, including the
individuation of targeting decisions, the infusion of legality into
war-making, and widespread concern that national security
decision-making favors aggressive policies and lacks sufficient
transparency, accountability, and deliberation. Viewing warfare
as regulation also helps reformers better identify the pathologies
in the regulatory process and their true causes.
* Associate Professor, Valparaiso University Law School. I must thank
Jean Galbraith, Evan Criddle, Jonathan Hafetz, Miriam Baer, Michael
Sant’Ambrogio, Melissa Durkee, Maggie Gardner, Scott Sullivan, Ryan Scoville,
Jeremy Telman, David Herzig, Neha Jain, Marc Falkoff, Bec Hamilton, Geoffrey
Heeren, and Alan Miller, as well as participants in workshops at the University
of Pennsylvania Law School, the University of Washington School of Law,
Valparaiso University Law School, and the John Marshall Law School for their
thoughtful comments.
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Using basic insights from public choice theory, and using the
practice of targeted killing as a case study, this Article maps the
power dynamics and bureaucratic incentives that drive national
security regulating. It concludes that these dynamics and
incentives systematically encourage overregulation. This Article
then explores administrative law principles, institutional reforms,
and new opportunities for political influence that may create
countervailing anti-regulatory pressures.
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I. Introduction
This Article examines, for the first time, the U.S.
government’s national security activities as a form of regulatory
action.1 It focuses on the targeted killing process—specifically,
the use of drones to kill members of armed groups in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen—as a
case study for how bureaucrats regulate in the national security
realm.2
Like all U.S. national security endeavors, this targeting
process is undertaken by the world’s largest bureaucracy.3 The
1. The term “national security” lacks a precise definition, but it seems to
be an ever-expanding concept. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DOD DICTIONARY OF
MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 162 (2017) (defining national security as
encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States
with the purpose of gaining a military or defense advantage over any foreign
nation or group of nations, a favorable foreign relations position, or a defense
posture capable of resisting hostile or destructive action); BARAK ORBACH,
REGULATION: WHY AND HOW THE STATE REGULATES 2 (2013) (defining regulation
as government intervention in the private domain); infra Part II (arguing that
national security qualifies as regulatory action because most of its actions can
be categorized as either rulemaking or adjudication).
2. See generally THE DRONE MEMOS: TARGETED KILLING, SECRECY, AND THE
LAW (Jameel Jaffer ed., 2016) [hereinafter Jaffer] (detailing the U.S.
government’s previously secret legal and policy documents concerning the
targeted killing program); DANIEL KLAIDMAN, KILL OR CAPTURE: THE WAR ON
TERROR AND THE SOUL OF THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY (2012) (describing the
executive branch decision-making behind the escalation of the drone program).
3. See Niall McCarthy, The World’s Biggest Employers, FORBES (June 23,
2015, 8:20 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2015/06/23/theworlds-biggest-employers-infographic/#3ae7382c51d0 (last visited Nov. 12,
2017) (reporting that the U.S. Department of Defense was the largest employer
in the world in 2015, with 3.2 million workers, followed by China’s People’s
Liberation Army (2.3 million), Walmart (2.1 million), McDonald’s (1.9 million),
and the U.K.’s National Health Service (1.7 million)) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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U.S. national security state comprises the Departments of
Defense, State, and Homeland Security, the National Security
Council (NSC), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the
National Security Agency (NSA), and more than a thousand other
sub-agencies within them and in other departments.4 These
agencies employ millions.5 Their activities account for more than
half of all federal discretionary spending.6
Yet the growing academic literature on the administration of
national security activities largely treats them as conduct to be
regulated, rather than as a form of regulation.7 For example,
under the predominant paradigm, the drone bureaucracy is seen
as a subject of regulation, rather than as an entity that regulates
those affected by drone strikes.8 It seems natural, then, for critics
4. The Intelligence Community officially consists of seventeen
organizations, but they have numerous agencies nested within them, and many
other departments and agencies have intelligence-collection arms. See Members
of the IC, OFF. DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/whatwe-do/members-of-the-ic (last visited Nov. 12, 2017) (noting that the intelligence
community is composed of two independent agencies, eight Department of
Defense elements, and seven elements of other federal departments and
agencies) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); DANA PRIEST &
WILLIAM M. ARKIN, TOP SECRET AMERICA: THE RISE OF THE NEW AMERICAN
SECURITY STATE 86 (2011) (reporting that 1,074 federal government
organizations and nearly 2,000 private companies work on programs related to
counterterrorism, homeland security, and intelligence in at least 17,000
locations across the United States).
5. See MICHAEL J. GLENNON, NATIONAL SECURITY AND DOUBLE
GOVERNMENT 16 (2014) (observing that the total annual outlay for federal
agencies engaged in national security is around $1 trillion and that those
agencies employ millions).
6. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENT’S 2017
BUDGET 24 (2016) (reporting that the President’s 2017 budget allocated $610
billion for defense discretionary spending and $564 billion for nondefense
discretionary spending).
7. See infra notes 68–71 and accompanying text (explaining that legal
scholarship assumes a distinction between domestic bureaucrats’ regulatory
activities and the government’s war-making activities).
8. See Joshua Andresen, Putting Lethal Force on the Table: How Drones
Change the Alternative Space of War and Counterterrorism, 8 HARV. NAT’L SEC.
J. 426, 434 (2017) (suggesting that drones present unique legal challenges and
require legal innovations to regulate them). See generally Andrew M. Anderson,
Comment, Look, Up in the Sky!: Regulating Drone Use to Protect Our Safety and
Privacy, 88 TEMP. L. REV. ONLINE 48 (2017) (arguing that precise legislation is
necessary to regulate drone use to protect privacy).
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of those activities to pitch reform proposals as attempts to
regulate “the war machine,”9 instead of attempts to identify and
correct errors in an existing regulatory system.10 Their proposals
are aimed at striking that elusive balance between liberty and
security.11 The difficulty is that, without a theory of how and why
the national security bureaucracy regulates, these reform
proposals do not engage with the biggest source of problems—
power dynamics, bureaucratic incentives, and the pathologies
they cause.12
This Article begins, in Part II, by offering an explanation for
why modeling national security activities as regulation has not
previously been attempted.13 Several factors—the perceived
uniqueness of national security as an area of government activity
and the nature of traditional warfare, in particular—contributed
to scholars’ neglect of national security activities when exploring
the regulatory behavior of agencies.14
Next, in Part III, this Article explains why changes in the
nature of warfare and the national security state’s modes and
9. See Part II.B (explaining how traditional modes of warfare fit uneasily
with concepts of regulation); GILLES DELEUZE & FELIX GUATTARI, A THOUSAND
PLATEAUS: CAPITALISM AND SCHIZOPHRENIA 352 (Brian Massumi trans., 1987)
(“[I]rreducible to the State apparatus . . . outside its sovereignty and prior to its
law: it comes from elsewhere.”).
10. See infra notes 410–467 and accompanying text (describing the
bureaucratic process of adding a nominee to the kill list).
11. See infra notes 187–196 and accompanying text (discussing factors
unique to national security that make it difficult to measure the effectiveness
and efficiency of national security regulation); Matthew C. Waxman, National
Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64 STAN. L. REV. 289, 290 (2012)
(stating that national security law scholarship focuses almost entirely on how
the federal government balances liberty and security); ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN
VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 38
(2007) (performing analysis that weighs liberty losses against security gains).
12. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the domestic and foreign players
connected to the drone bureaucracy); Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building
Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 925 (2005)
(emphasizing that “predictions about the behavior of government institutions
ought to rest on plausible accounts of the interests of individual officials who
direct these institutions”).
13. See infra Part II (summarizing national security characteristics giving
rise to the current paradigm and accounting for that paradigm’s persistence).
14. See infra notes 58–71 and accompanying text (describing the recent
legal scholarship on national security regulation).
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scope of activity have made a warfare-as-regulation model both
viable and necessary.15 The expansion of national security
activities into the domestic realm imposes more concentrated
costs on U.S. citizens in the United States.16 In addition, the
nature of warfare has fundamentally changed so that it routinely
involves legal interpretation, rulemaking, and individualized
determinations that are tantamount to adjudication.17 These
activities are the meat and drink of regulating agencies.18
It is time to embrace the reality that what looks, swims, and
quacks like regulating is just that. The warfare-as-regulation
paradigm is better suited for depicting the behavior of the
national security state than the dominant regulated-war-machine
paradigm.19 Moreover, by grounding national security activities
firmly in the language, concepts, and theory of regulation, the
warfare-as-regulation paradigm provides a cohesive explanatory
framework for recent trends—including the individuation of
detention and targeting decisions,20 the infusion of legality into
war-making,21 and widespread concern that national security
15. See infra Part III (explaining the impact of globalization and the
changing nature of warfare).
16. See infra notes 140–150 (describing domestic national security costs to
U.S. citizens’ privacy).
17. See infra Part IV.A.2 (detailing the government’s process of identifying
targets and procuring drones).
18. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (prescribing the process for
notice-and-comment rulemaking); 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–557 (2012) (prescribing the
process for agency adjudication); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227
(2001) (stating that adjudicating and notice-and-comment rulemaking are two
major ways Congress delegates authority to agencies).
19. See infra Part III (discussing how factors that led to the current
paradigm are becoming less important).
20. See infra Part III.A.2 (describing the individualized determination of
targets as similar to agency adjudication processes); Samuel Issacharoff &
Richard H. Pildes, Targeted Warfare: Individuating Enemy Responsibility, 88
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521, 1523 (2013) (observing the shift from the traditional war
practice of defining an enemy by a group-based judgment to the current
practice, requiring individuation of enemy responsibility before military force is
justified).
21. See infra Part III.B (arguing that the warfare-as-regulation paradigm
ensures better compliance with domestic and international law); Margo
Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency’s Civil
Liberties Gap, 6 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 112, 118 (2015) (arguing that intelligence
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decision-making favors aggressive policies and lacks sufficient
transparency, accountability, and deliberation.22
Part IV introduces a warfare-as-regulation model for the
specific context of targeted killing that also applies, with some
variation, to other national security activities. In constructing a
simple model, like much of administrative law literature on
agency behavior, this Article relies on classic insights from public
choice theory, which are contested.23 However, the evidence
strongly suggests that, irrespective of bureaucratic incentives in
domestic regulation, these classic insights are accurate regarding
national security bureaucrats: they are motivated by zeal for the
counterterrorism mission; they strive to maximize their agency’s
budget, authority, and prestige; and, like domestic bureaucrats,
they tend to overregulate concerning rare, high-profile risks.24
In the targeted killing process, U.S. government agencies,
supported by private firms, interpret and apply a set of
substantive rules derived from international and domestic law as
they develop intelligence, select targets, and carry out targeting
operations.25 When these activities are viewed as a form of
legalism is not effective in protecting individual liberties).
22. See infra Part III.B (suggesting that an accurate national security
regulatory model effectively accomplishes risk management); Philip Alston, The
CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders, 2 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 283, 284
(2011) (noting that the Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Department of
Defense conduct significant extraterritorial targeted killings without
accountability under domestic law or international obligations).
23. See RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 2 (Daniel
A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010) (noting that public choice theory
rests on assumptions that public actors behave rationally and act consistently to
pursue particular objectives).
24. See infra Section III.D.1 (discussing incentives and traits of national
security bureaucrats); GLENNON, supra note 5, at 26–28 (depicting national
security bureaucrats as team players who are committed to the process rather
than the outcome); STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 9–11 (1993) (describing domestic agencies’
tendency to overregulate high-profile, low probability risks).
25. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROCEDURES FOR APPROVING DIRECT ACTION
AGAINST TERRORIST TARGETS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES AND AREAS OF
ACTIVE HOSTILITIES 1 (2013) [hereinafter Drone Playbook] (prescribing
procedures for approving targeted killing operations outside Iraq, Afghanistan,
and Syria); Gregory S. McNeal, Targeted Killing and Accountability, 102 GEO.
L.J. 681, 701–33 (2014) (summarizing the bureaucratic process involved in
certain types of targeted killing). See generally JEREMY SCAHILL, THE
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regulation, that targeted killing bureaucracy resembles the
fabled overreaching government agency of conservative
nightmares in the 1970s and 80s—captured by a handful of
public interest organizations and populated by empire-building,
prestige-oriented bureaucrats who together drive the agency to
overregulate without regard to the costs and long-term
consequences.26 The difference is that the “public interest
organizations” are, in this case, powerful military and
intelligence contractors.27
The bureaucrats’ incentives, and the lack of countervailing
pressures, consistently push the national security bureaucracy
toward overregulation.28 Under normal circumstances, in other
words, that bureaucracy will use greater force or broader
surveillance than necessary to efficiently achieve its objectives.29
This Article then offers an account of how these bureaucratic
incentives influence decision-making in the specific context of the
targeting process.30 The national security bureaucracy maximizes
ASSASSINATION COMPLEX: INSIDE THE GOVERNMENT’S SECRET DRONE WARFARE
PROGRAM (2016) (offering, based on leaked documents and interviews, a more
skeptical view of the process’s effectiveness at producing accurate intelligence,
successfully eliminating enemies, and avoiding unnecessary civilian deaths and
injuries).
26. See infra Part IV.D.1 (describing the development of public choice
theory in the 1970s and 1980s); Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg,
White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1081 (1986)
[hereinafter DeMuth & Ginsburg, White House Review] (depicting regulation as
excessively cautious and favoring narrow groups instead of the general public);
cf. Jaffer, supra note 2, at 9–10 (describing the formation of the targeted killing
bureaucracy).
27. See LAURA A. DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE: PRESERVING
PUBLIC VALUES IN A WORLD OF PRIVATIZED FOREIGN AFFAIRS 118 (2011)
[hereinafter DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE] (noting that, in the first
eighteen months of the Bush administration, at least thirty-two top policy
appointees were former executives, consultants, or major shareholders of top
military contractors); ANDREW COCKBURN, KILL CHAIN: RISE OF THE HIGH-TECH
ASSASSINS 49–50 (2015) (discussing how, following the Vietnam War, defense
contractors mobilized support in Congress for various drone projects).
28. See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 19 (“The resulting incentive structure
encourages the exaggeration of existing threats . . . .”).
29. See id. (observing that the exaggeration of existing threats may also
include creating new threats).
30. See infra Section IV.D.1 (explaining the incentives driving the national
security bureaucracy).
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agency prestige by producing enough targets to maintain the
drone program’s primacy as a counterterrorism tool.31 In order to
do so, it incentivizes the intelligence community and private
contractors to supply targets.32 When strikes fail to kill an
intended target, the agencies respond to this prestige threat by
incentivizing the finding of intelligence to support a
determination that those actually killed qualified as “enemies.”33
The result is that, despite rigorous internal bureaucratic control
mechanisms, the agencies involved in targeted killing will tend to
overregulate—to launch too many strikes with inadequate
intelligence, and to adopt overbroad assumptions that favor
counting those killed as “enemies.”34
Part V explores ways to compensate for the large imbalance
in favor of overregulation in the targeting process specifically,
and in the national security realm more generally. It offers no
easy solutions.35 Because agencies in the national security state
all generally share the same counterterrorism mission and
bureaucratic incentives, institutional reforms that may be
successful in the domestic context are unlikely to have the same
effect in the national security context.36
31. See OFFICE OF DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, SUMMARY OF INFORMATION
REGARDING U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM STRIKES OUTSIDE AREAS OF ACTIVE
HOSTILITIES 1 (2016) (reporting between 2,372 to 2,581 combatant deaths by
drone strike between Jan. 20, 2009 and Dec. 31, 2015).
32. See SCAHILL, supra note 25, at 71 (describing a former drone operator’s
observation that there is an ever-increasing demand to add more targets to the
kill list).
33. See infra notes 356–3369 (discussing the incentives for finding
intelligence to support the “enemy” designation).
34. See, e.g., Jaffer, supra note 2, at 13–14 (offering evidence that the drone
bureaucracy applied a presumption of combatant status if there was no evidence
showing those killed were innocent bystanders); see also infra Section IV.D.1
(discussing how bureaucrats’ incentives guide national security regulating).
35. See infra Part V (discussing the value of recognizing the strong
pro-regulatory and weak anti-regulatory forces to help reformers correct the
imbalance).
36. See infra Part V.A (describing the unique institutional reform
considerations in the national security context); Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial
Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the Department of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV.
271, 335 (2013) [hereinafter Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor
Bias and the Department of Justice] (proposing re-assignment of some
Department of Justice functions to other agencies with different institutional
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Courts or truly independent quasi-judicial review bodies
could help address the imbalance if they would apply
administrative law principles that encourage and test agencies’
contemporaneous reason-giving.37 Although two scholars have
previously proposed applying them in internal CIA procedures to
increase accountability,38 this Article provides a different
rationale for them—that their most important attributes are their
anti-regulatory effects.39
Finally, this Article identifies emerging opportunities to use
political influence to alter bureaucratic incentives in the
targeting process by focusing on the military contractors
intimately involved in it.40 In particular, the rapid growth of the
law enforcement and commercial drone market may create new
cleavages between contractors seeking to expand into domestic
markets and the bureaucrats they work with in the targeting
process.41 If the public, U.S. and worldwide, becomes more aware
of the costs of drone use, it could pressure the private firms, who
in turn could pressure the bureaucrats to scale back the level of
regulation.42
missions as a means of blunting prosecutors’ incentives to over-regulate).
37. See infra Part V.B (asserting that establishing a judicial review
mechanism can reduce the incentive to over-regulate); SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
318 U.S. 80, 94–95 (1943) (holding that agency decisions may be upheld by
courts only on the grounds articulated by the agency during the decision-making
process); Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE
L.J. 952, 958–59 (2007) (arguing that Chenery, by prohibiting agencies from
relying on post hoc rationales, promotes the core values of the nondelegation
doctrine, assuring the agency has exercised judgment on an issue in the first
instance).
38. See Afsheen John Radsan & Richard Murphy, Measure Twice, Shoot
Once: Higher Care for CIA-Targeted Killing, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1201, 1235
(2011) (observing that U.S. administrative law, the “hard look” and Chenery
doctrines in particular, are useful for “fleshing out” the procedures for reviewing
CIA drone strikes).
39. See infra Part V (discussing the benefits of applying key administrative
law principles to the national security context).
40. See COCKBURN, supra note 27, at 16–20 (explaining that contractors are
intimately involved in nearly every stage of the targeting process); infra Part
III.D.1 (discussing contractors’ incentives).
41. See infra Part V.C (discussing how firms experience a shift in
incentives when supplying for commercial and private use).
42. See infra Part V.C (arguing that heightened public awareness of the
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II. Two Paradigms of National Security Activities: The Regulated
War Machine and the Regulating War Bureaucracy
The term “regulation,” as I use it here, encompasses any
“government intervention in the private domain,”43 but also
extends to government activity designed to control the conduct of
public entities as well.44 The types of regulation that receive the
most attention are activities by agencies that impose a
concentrated cost on a regulated subject.45 The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), for example, imposes caps on emissions,
requiring polluters to spend money, either by producing less and
forgoing profits, or by upgrading their equipment.46 The criminal
justice system is made up of agencies—including police
departments, sentencing commissions, and prosecutor’s offices—

costs of drone strikes increases political pressure to regulate).
43. See Barak Orbach, What Is Regulation?, 30 YALE J. ON REG. ONLINE 1,
10 (2013) (discussing uncertain and contested definitions of “regulation” in
American legal history). Compare Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.
Ct. 2566, 2621–25 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (arguing that the power to regulate includes the power to compel
activities), with id. at 2644 (joint dissent) (arguing that the phrase “to regulate”
“can mean to direct the manner of something but not to direct that something
come into being”). See generally ORBACH, supra note 1 (defining regulation as
government intervention in the private domain).
44. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (2012) (defining “person” to include a public or
private organization).
45. See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 721
(2005) [hereinafter Barkow, Administering Crime] (describing a typical agency
regulation under which the subject of the regulation suffers a concentrated cost).
Regulation should impose the concentrated costs on the entities that are
externalizing them to society, forcing those entities to re-internalize the costs.
See Victor B. Flatt, Should the Circle Be Unbroken?: A Review of the Hon.
Stephen Breyer’s Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation,
24 ENVTL. L. 1707, 1707 (1994) (book review) (“The goal is to internalize
externalities so that everyone makes economically logical choices concerning
their decisions and innocent persons are not unfairly burdened.”).
46. These costs may also be passed on to consumers. See Arnold W. Reitze,
Jr., State and Federal Command-and-Control Regulation of Emissions from
Fossil-Fuel Electric Power Generating Plants, 32 ENVTL. L. 369, 375–76 (2002)
(noting that utility companies pass the costs of complying with environmental
regulations directly to consumers or incorporate the costs into the base rate).
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that regulate by restricting the public’s freedom and by arresting,
fining, and incarcerating individuals.47
Most significant agency regulatory activities fall into one of
two categories—rulemaking or adjudication.48 Adjudication is an
individualized determination based on specific facts; rulemaking,
in contrast, is a proceeding, often involving broad participation by
interested parties, that results in a policy of widespread
application.49 The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) defines
both types of proceedings.50 But even activities that fall outside
statutory definitions, or do not qualify as “agency action” at all,51
can still generally be categorized as either rulemaking or
adjudication.52 For example, the Social Security Administration
47. See Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L.
REV. 91, 91 (2016) (“Police agencies should be governed by the same
administrative principles that govern other agencies.”); Barkow, Prosecutorial
Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the Department of Justice, supra note 36,
at 273 (analyzing the Department of Justice as an agency that regulates
corrections, clemency, and forensics); see also Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation,
67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 810–11 (2015) (describing how agencies in immigration
enforcement, public housing, licensing, and child protective services use arrest
information as a regulatory tool). See generally Barkow, supra note 45
(evaluating sentencing commissions as regulating agencies).
48. See Eric E. Johnson, Agencies and Science-Experiment Risk, 2016 U.
ILL. L. REV. 527, 558 (2016) (“Based on the statutory attention lavished on
[rulemaking and adjudication], it is clear that the APA sees these activities as
the two most important modes of agency work.”); Christopher DeMuth, Can the
Administrative State be Tamed?, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 121, 122 (2016) (observing
that “regulation” also includes other activities, such as rule enforcement,
licensing, and producing guidance documents).
49. See Johnson, supra note 48, at 558 (describing adjudication as the
quasi-judicial and rulemaking as the quasi-legislative function of agencies); see
also, e.g., Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534,
1540 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Where an agency’s task is to ‘adjudicate disputed facts in
particular cases,’ an administrative determination is quasi-judicial. By contrast,
rulemaking concerns policy judgments to be applied generally in cases that may
arise in the future . . . .”).
50. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2012) (“[R]ulemaking means agency process for
formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.”); 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (2012)
(“[A]djudication means agency process for the formulation of an order.”).
51. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2012) (“[A]gency action includes the whole or a
part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial
thereof, or failure to act.”).
52. See Sean Croston, It Means What It Says: Deciphering and Respecting
the APA’s Definition of “Rule”, 53 WASHBURN L.J. 27, 40–42 (2013) (discussing
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conducts rulemaking when it issues handbooks to its employees
to guide them in the application of the agency’s regulations.53 And
a police department engages in adjudication when an officer
arrests a criminal suspect.54
The U.S. government’s most significant national security
activities also fit within the definition of regulation. Like agencies
that regulate drug manufacturers or polluters, the national
security state’s core mission is to limit risk—to provide safety to
American society by imposing concentrated costs on potential or
actual enemies and the public.55 And like criminal justice
agencies, the national security state often imposes those costs
through the application of coercive power directly upon
individuals—both enemies and the public.56
opinions in which courts have interpreted the APA’s definition of “rule”
narrowly to exclude many rule-type determinations).
53. See Timothy H. Gray, Manual Override? Accardi, Skidmore, and the
Legal Effect of the Social Security Administration’s Hallex Manual, 114 COLUM.
L. REV. 949, 95051 (2014) (criticizing the reasoning and conclusion in Moore v.
Apfel); see also Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that
the SSA’s internal guidance manual “does not have the force and effect of
law . . . [and] is not binding on the [agency]”).
54. See Jain, supra note 47, at 818 (observing that the decision to arrest a
suspect is an individualized determination in which police officers or
magistrates exercise broad delegated discretion in applying the probable cause
standard to a specific set of facts); Slobogin, supra note 47, at 96 (“In
administrative law parlance, the suspicion-based model of policing could be
characterized as a form of ‘adjudication’ by the officer on the street.”).
55. See PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT 12 (2008) (arguing that most
democracies today have evolved into “market states,” whose “strategic raison
d’être . . . is the protection of civilians, not simply territory or national wealth or
any particular dynasty, class, religion, or ideology”); BREYER, supra note 24, at
910 (1993) (explaining that the regulatory system can be divided into two
parts—“risk assessment,” and “risk management”); Emily Berman, Regulating
Domestic Intelligence Collection, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 6–7 (2014)
(proposing that the risk-management literature be utilized to develop a more
rights-protective approach to the regulation of domestic intelligence collection);
Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Rationalism in Regulation, 108
MICH. L. REV. 877, 908 (2010) (“Contemporary regulation is concerned almost
exclusively with the mitigation of risks . . . to human health and the
environment; risks to the solvency of financial institutions; and risks from
hazardous products, automobiles, workplace conditions, and so on.”).
56. See Slobogin, supra note 47, at 96 (comparing agency adjudication to
the discretionary decision a police officer makes to “stop, arrest, or search
someone”).
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Moreover, when the national security state regulates, most of
its actions fall within the general definition of either rulemaking
or adjudication.57 The Transportation Security Administration
(TSA)
engages
in
rulemaking
when
it
prescribes
security-screening measures for airline passengers.58 The NSA
engages in rulemaking when it determines the parameters of
search terms that will yield individuals’ private information for
analysis.59 A combatant command conducts rulemaking when it
formulates rules of engagement, which dictate when and how
military personnel may use lethal force against an enemy.60 And
the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) engages in
adjudication when it vets and validates the “nomination” of an
individual for the “kill list.”61
Scholars and the general public have long recognized that the
modern national security state consists of a vast, complex, and
often-dysfunctional bureaucracy.62 But until recently, it was rare
57. This is obscured by the several ways in which the APA makes national
security rulemaking and adjudication exempt from its procedural requirements.
See, e.g., Robert Knowles, National Security Rulemaking, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
883, 904–05 (2014) (describing the national security exceptions).
58. See, e.g., Passenger Screening Using Advanced Imaging Technology, 78
Fed. Reg. 18,287-01 (Mar. 26, 2013) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1540)
(providing that the TSA may use “advanced imaging technology” to screen
airline passengers).
59. See United States Signals Intelligence Directive 18: Legal Compliance
and Minimization Procedures, NAT’L SECURITY AGENCY (July 22, 1993),
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB23/07-01.htm (last visited
Nov. 12, 2017) (prescribing NSA rules for protecting constitutional rights of U.S.
persons and the collection, processing, and dissemination of information
concerning U.S. persons) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 5240.1-R, PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES
OF DOD INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS THAT AFFECT UNITED STATES PERSONS (1982),
http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodm/524001r.pdf
(detailing the role of DOD personnel and resources in the NSA programs).
60. See, e.g., NATO INT’L SEC. ASSISTANCE FORCE, COMISAF’S TACTICAL
DIRECTIVE (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.rs.nato.int/images/docs/20111105%
20nuc%20tactical%20directive%20revision%204%20(releaseable%20version)%2
0r.pdf (prescribing directions for lowering civilian causalities in Afghanistan).
61. McNeal, supra note 25, at 728.
62. Criticism of the national security bureaucracy since the 1960s has
emphasized its entanglement with the defense industry and members of
Congress seeking federal largesse for their constituents. See, e.g., GORDON
ADAMS, THE IRON TRIANGLE: THE POLITICS OF DEFENSE CONTRACTING 2426
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for scholars to analyze the functioning of agencies within this
bureaucracy.63 And the regulatory nature of that bureaucracy has
received little-to-no attention.64 Debates about the proper scope
and mode of federal regulation from the 1960s onward focused on
domestic matters—economic regulation, such as the markets for
air transportation and telecommunications; and quality of life,
such as the workplace and the environment.65 When scholarly
analysis touched on the government’s national security activities,
it discussed how efficiently and effectively that bureaucracy
delivers the service of national security rather than on how, in
delivering this service, national security activities also regulate.66
Since 9/11, legal scholars have paid more attention to the
workings of the national security bureaucracy and the
subsequent reorganization of many agencies involved in
intelligence-gathering, homeland security, and immigration.67 As
part of the broader debate about how national security laws and
institutions can strike the correct balance between liberty and
(1981) (asserting that key national security policy decisions are made by a closeknit and exclusive group of federal bureaucrats, key members of Congress, and
private business officials); see Yochai Benkler, A Public Accountability Defense
for National Security Leakers and Whistleblowers, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 281,
288 (“‘National security’ is the system made up of state bureaucracies (the
Pentagon, CIA, NSA, National Security Council (‘NSC’), etc.) and market
bureaucracies (Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Booz Allen Hamilton, Halliburton).”).
63. See AMY ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, NSA,
AND JCS 2 (1999) (“[E]xisting work in political science provides little help [in
understanding national security agency interaction]. U.S. foreign policy
agencies in general and national security agencies in particular have been
vastly understudied in the discipline.”).
64. See John Yoo, Administration of War, 58 DUKE L.J. 2277, 2282 (2009)
(“To the extent that administrative law scholars touched on the military, they
have tended to focus on the question of delegated authority . . . .”).
65. Jerry Mashaw, Public Law and Public Choice: Critique and
Rapprochement, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW,
supra note 23, at 24–26.
66. See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 18 (1971) (limiting the scope of his analysis of public bureaus to
the services they provide, rather than their regulatory functions). In this highly
influential work, Niskanen briefly suggested that military strategy was driven
by demand and budget constraints. See generally id. at 76.
67. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 401 (2012)).
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security,68 legal scholars began exploring the ways administrative
law principles can or should be applied to the government’s
national security activities.69 Relatedly, in the spirit of earlier
analysis of domestic regulation, some scholars are beginning to
draw on insights from public choice theory to consider which
types of procedures and institutional designs are most effective in
fighting terrorism.70 Deborah Pearlstein and Samuel Rascoff have
separately observed family resemblances between the
development of the national security bureaucracy and what
Pearlstein calls the “broader administrative state.”71
But legal scholars still hesitate to treat the national security
state as a bureaucracy that regulates. They still draw sharp
distinctions between the work civil bureaucrats do and the work

68. See Evan Fox-Decent & Evan J. Criddle, Interest-Balancing Vs.
Fiduciary Duty: Two Models for National Security Law, 13 GERMAN L.J. 542,
542 (2011) (“By all accounts, interest balancing has provided the primary model
for making national security law and policy worldwide since September 11,
2001.”). See generally POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 11.
69. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign
Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1176 (2007) (applying Chevron to foreign
relations law, both directly and by analogy); see Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar
Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1233 (2007)
(rejecting the presumptive application of Chevron deference to any executive
interpretation in the foreign affairs context); Knowles, supra note 57, at 891
(arguing for scaling back the scope of exceptions for national security
rulemaking carved out in the APA); Radsan & Murphy, supra note 38, at 1235
(observing that in U.S. Administrative Law, the “hard look” and Chenery
doctrines in particular, are useful for “fleshing out” the procedures for ex-post
review of CIA drone strikes); Ganesh Sitaraman, Foreign Hard Look Review, 66
ADMIN. L. REV. 489, 492 (2014) (proposing that foreign relations law be viewed
“as akin to an area of domestic regulatory law” so that judicial review will
involve the application of administrative law principles); Yoo, supra note 64, at
2281 (“Administrative law scholarship has generally passed over the study of
the military in favor of the domestic agencies.”).
70. See generally Samuel J. Rascoff, Presidential Intelligence, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 633, 705 (2016); Nathan Alexander Sales, Share and Share Alike:
Intelligence Agencies and Information Sharing, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 279, 282
(2010); Yoo, supra note 64, at 2283.
71. See Deborah N. Pearlstein, The Soldier, the State, and the Separation of
Powers, 90 TEX. L. REV. 797, 799 (2012) (“[T]he modern military in many ways
enjoys the functional advantages, now long embraced, of administrative
agencies.”); Rascoff, supra note 70, at 63738 (“[T]here is a lot to recommend the
analogy between the intelligence apparatus and the administrative state . . . .”).
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of “spies and soldiers,”72 and treat the government’s warmaking
activities as a system separate from, if entangled with, the law.73
Proposals to introduce more discipline, accountability, and
deliberation into the targeted killing process, for example, are
pitched as efforts to prevent officials from acting “with
impunity,”74 “operating unchecked,”75 or “being issued a general
hunting license.”76 When legal scholars refer to “regulating
warfare,” they are interested in ways that the law can or should
impose restrictions on the activities of the national security state,
in the same way that government restricts the activities of
individual citizens or firms.77
In other words, the paradigm that dominates the legal and
professional discourse is about the regulation of warmaking, not
72. David Zaring & Elena Baylis, Sending the Bureaucracy to War, 92 IOWA
L. REV. 1359, 1374 (2007).
73. See Carla Crandall, If You Can’t Beat Them, Kill Them: Complex
Adaptive Systems Theory and the Rise in Targeted Killing, 43 SETON HALL L.
REV. 595, 598 (2013) [hereinafter Crandall, If You Can’t Beat Them, Kill Them:
Complex Adaptive Systems Theory and the Rise in Targeted Killing] (describing
the “nonlinear dynamic systems of warfare and national security law”).
74. See Carla Crandall, Ready . . . Fire . . . Aim! A Case for Applying
American Due Process Principles Before Engaging in Drone Strikes, 24 FLA. J.
INT’L L. 55, 58 (2012) (arguing that due process requires the establishment of
“review tribunals” comparable to Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs)).
75. See Toren G. Evers-Mushovic & Michael Hughes, Rules for When There
Are No Rules: Examining the Legality of Putting American Terrorists in the
Crosshairs Abroad, 18 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 157, 15960, 17982 (2012)
(proposing presidential sign-off on all targeted killings of Americans and
independent ex-post investigation that reports to Congress).
76. Radsan & Murphy, supra note 38, at 1209.
77. See id. at 1232 (analogizing military operations during traditional wars
to the actions of private citizens, whose typical decisions are not subject to
official scrutiny unless “the relevant authorities . . . have grounds for believing a
serious violation has occurred”); Oona A. Hathaway, Rebecca Crootof, Daniel
Hessel, Julia Shu & Sarah Weiner, Consent Is Not Enough: Why States Must
Respect the Intensity Threshold in Transnational Conflict, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
17 (2016) (“[Jus ad bellum rules] create a potential loophole in the legal
regulation of the use of military force that could leave consent-based
interventions dangerously under-regulated.”); McNeal, supra note 25, at 781–83
(describing the process of targeted killing as being carried out by a bureaucracy
and discussing internal and external control mechanisms); Sales, supra note 70,
at 28283 (analogizing intelligence-collection agencies to private firms). But cf.
Rascoff, supra note 70, at 662 (describing how the telecommunications industry
“has now taken a stance against ‘overregulation’ by the intelligence state”).
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about warmaking as regulation. Although I focus here on one
mode of warfare, the analytical problems I discuss generally
apply to the whole panoply of national security activities,
including surveillance, covert action, border control, and foreign
affairs. I call this dominant paradigm the regulated-war-machine.
Below, I discuss reasons why this paradigm came to dominate
and why it persists. I then explain why it falls short in accurately
modeling today’s national security regulatory activities.
A. The Conceptual Difficulty
The American public, the Congress, and the courts are
accustomed to treating national security as a unique and
separate sphere of government activity.78 Areas like health care
and banking, for example, saw fierce debates on the propriety of
government intervention in the private marketplace.79 But
national security was the first, and is the essential, government
function, necessary to the very existence of society and the
state.80 Government is, if nothing else, the entity with a monopoly
on the use of force.81 Americans never debated whether the U.S.
government should conduct national security activities at all—it
always has and it always will.82
78.
79.

See generally Crandall, supra note 73.
See, e.g., THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE
POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 153205 (1992)
(describing failed Nineteenth Century efforts to centralize federal government
functions in a health and welfare ministry). See generally JAMES WILLARD
HURST, LAW AND MARKETS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (2010) (describing the rise
of market regulation in the U.S.).
80. See Laura A. Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 31
YALE J. INT’L L. 383, 390 (2006) (“Probably no function of government is deemed
more quintessentially a ‘state’ function than the military protection of the state
itself . . . .”).
81. See id. (arguing that privatizing military functions could “threaten” the
government’s “existence” by reducing its control of the use of force); Kristen
Eichensehr, Public-Private Cybersecurity, 95 TEX. L. REV. 467, 475 (2017)
(observing that crime control, foreign policy, and national defense closely relate
“to the modern understanding that the state’s function is to monopolize the
legitimate use of force within a territory and to protect its citizens from both
internal and external threats”).
82. See DELEUZE & GUATTARI, supra note 9, at 35254 (theorizing that the

WARFARE AS REGULATION

1971

Because the private realm could not exist or survive without
national security, it is difficult to conceptualize national security
activities as intervening in that private realm. Instead, it has
been easier to conceptualize other public entities—legal
frameworks including international law, the Congress, the courts,
internal oversight organizations—as intervening to correct errors
in the functioning of an ever-present war machine.83
B. The Nature of Traditional Warfare
Moreover, the regulated-war-machine paradigm has
dominated because the nature of traditional warfare made
national security activities an uneasy fit with common notions of
what regulation is.84 Most forms of domestic regulation are
observable, concern matters accessible to the trained professional
in the field, involve public participation, govern activities inside
the United States, and impose concentrated costs primarily on
U.S. citizens and corporations.85
Traditional warfare was, in several fundamental respects,
just the opposite. First, it was difficult to conceive of traditional
warfare as government intervention in the private domain.86
Traditional warfare was primarily “characterized by amassed
armies on pitched battlefields” or “tank battalions maneuvering
to break through enemy lines.”87 The goal of warfare has always
“war machine” preceded the existence of government and has been co-opted by
it).
83. See id. at 354 (arguing that it is necessary to conceptualize the “war
machine” as something different and separate from the “State apparatus”).
84. See id. at 352 (“As for the war machine in itself, it seems to be
irreducible to the State apparatus, to be outside its sovereignty and prior to its
law: it comes from elsewhere.”).
85. See Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass
Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173,
174 (1997) (“[U.S.] Administrative law has somewhat of a fetish for public
participation in agency decision-making.”); Michael P. Vandenbergh, From
Smokestack to SUV: The Individual As Regulated Entity in the New Era of
Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 523–33 (2004) (describing the forms
and processes of domestic environmental regulation).
86. See generally Crandall, supra note 73.
87. GANESH SITARAMAN, THE COUNTERINSURGENT’S CONSTITUTION: LAW IN
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been to destroy the enemy’s capacity or will to fight.88
Traditionally, this was accomplished through “kill-capture”—
destroy the enemy’s capacity by killing or capturing a sufficient
number of its soldiers and neutralizing its weaponry.89 The enemy
was identifiable: the distinction between uniformed combatants
and non-combatants was usually easy to draw.90 This type of
warfare does not resemble regulation—i.e., government
intervention in the private domain—so much as multiple
governments struggling for dominance.
By the Twentieth Century, with the rise of air power, “total
war” became the objective—“smashing the material and moral
resources of a people . . . until the final collapse of all social
organization.”91 The principles of international humanitarian law
developed in response, intended to constrain the destructiveness
of the war machines and prevent extreme suffering.92 But this
development only reinforced assumptions that warfare was a
phenomenon to be regulated. The practice of total war, although
it involves the private realm and is regulated by law, seems alien
to the concept of regulation—total war is annihilation, not
intervention.93
THE AGE OF SMALL WARS

3 (2012).
88. See id. at 23 (“Though killing and capturing does take place, it is not
the primary goal . . . .”).
89. Id. at 3233.
90. See id. at 36 (explaining that a key difference between the approaches
required of the counterinsurgent and the “conventional warrior” is that enemy
combatants are now “embedded in the local community”).
91. See WILLIAM C. MARTEL, VICTORY IN WAR: FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN
MILITARY POLICY 71 (2006) (quoting Italian military strategist Giulio Douhet).
92. See SITARAMAN, supra note 87, at 44 (explaining that the humanitarian
principle to not attack civilians developed from a “shift in military strategy”);
Eyal Benvenisti & Amichai Cohen, War Is Governance: Explaining the Logic of
the Laws of War from A Principal-Agent Perspective, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1363,
1367 (2014) (“Modern militaries and their civilian leaderships need IHL—
indeed, a kind of IHL that is specifically tailored to control the agents—because
they collectively face a daunting challenge of controlling their respective troops,
whose interests may diverge from their own.”).
93. See MARTEL, supra note 91, at 71 (“‘War must be total because the
decision,’ according to Douhet, ‘must depend upon smashing the material and
moral resources of a people . . . until the final collapse of all social
organization.’”).
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Second, traditional warfare, and national security activities
more generally, have always involved a great deal of secrecy.94
This aspect has only become more pronounced over time. By
2009, 1,074 U.S. government organizations worked on programs
at the top-secret level alone.95 The number of agencies and
employees working on merely “secret” level programs is surely
much larger.96 Secret government activities, by their very nature,
cannot involve the broad participation and corresponding
accountability—either to the public or Congress—that we expect
from regulatory activities.97
Third, military experts with unique expertise carried out
traditional warfare with scant public consultation.98 It is a
well-established legal trope that even the most complex and
technically obscure domestic regulatory subject is more
comprehensible to outside observers, and susceptible to
second-guessing, than foreign relations and national security
matters.99 Many modern developments—such as the end of
94. See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
5974 (1998) (tracing secrecy in the context of warfare from World War I to the
Cold War). See generally, GEOFFREY R. STONE, TOP SECRET: WHEN OUR
GOVERNMENT KEEPS US IN THE DARK chs. 1–3 (2007).
95. PRIEST & ARKIN, supra note 4, at 86.
96. See id. at 8687 (describing the expansion of government organizations
at the secret level post-9/11).
97. See Jonathan Hafetz, A Problem of Standards?: Another Perspective on
Secret Law, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2141, 2144 (2016) (“In some instances, the
debate over secret law . . . [focuses on] executive branch efforts to treat
congressional delegations as invitations to develop broad and malleable
standards that provide sufficient elasticity to respond to heterogeneous, often
rapidly developing events.”); Knowles, supra note 57, at 885–87 (explaining that
secret national security rulemaking does not undergo traditional APA
notice-and-comment rulemaking).
98. See Pearlstein, supra note 71, at 84950 (commenting on the growing
differences between civilians and the military).
99. See ZEGART, supra note 63, at 27 (“Whereas domestic policy is fairly out
in the open, much of national security agency activity is conducted in secret.”);
Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361,
1366–85 (2009) (describing how courts defer to the executive branch’s factual
national security assertions in different contexts); Anjali S. Dalal, Shadow
Administrative Constitutionalism and the Creation of Surveillance Culture, 2014
MICH. ST. L. REV. 61, 71 (2014) (describing the lack of guidelines governing the
FBI’s conduct under J. Edgar Hoover); Jonathan Masur, A Hard Look or A
Blind Eye: Administrative Law and Military Deference, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 441,
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conscription in the U.S., the professionalization of the military,100
and the dominance of technology in warfare—have widened the
military-civilian divide101 and enhanced the perceived uniqueness
of national security expertise.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the United States
waged traditional warfare almost exclusively abroad, and its
most concentrated costs were imposed on foreign citizens and
property.102 In other words, the U.S. government regulates foreign
citizens through its extraterritorial national security activities,
yet that concept is difficult to reconcile with theories of regulation
that justify government intervention in the private realm on
some version of a social contract model.103
C. Vague Grants of National Security Authority
These
aspects
of
traditional
warfare
and
the
regulated-war-machine paradigm they have inspired are reflected
in the post-World War II institutional design of the national
security state.104 Congress exempted much of the state’s
444 (2005) (analyzing “courts’ deference to the Executive’s wartime factual
determinations” and how this has “short-circuited the process of judicial
review”). Cf. Shirin Sinnar, Rule of Law Tropes in National Security, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 1566, 1568 (2016) (discussing the constitutionality of the “reasonable
suspicion” threshold for adding individuals to terrorist watch lists).
100. See Pearlstein, supra note 71, at 84950 (describing the transition from
the “citizen-soldier” to a professionalized military).
101. Id.; see DIANE H. MAZUR, A MORE PERFECT MILITARY: HOW THE
CONSTITUTION CAN MAKE OUR MILITARY STRONGER 76–77 (2010) (discussing how
the military has become more politically partisan); THOMAS E. RICKS, MAKING
THE CORPS 23 (1997) (describing a military that has become “Republicanized”
and features officers who “seem to look down on American society in a way that
the pre-World War II military didn’t”).
102. See Ruth Grant & Robert Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power
in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 39 (2005) (observing that, because
the United States primarily conducts warfare abroad, its reputation is insulated
at home).
103. See id. at 34 (“On the global level, there is no public that can . . . ground
the justification for accountability mechanisms of a democratic type.”).
104. See DOUGLAS T. STUART, CREATING THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE: A
HISTORY OF THE LAW THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 11011 (2008) (describing how
the U.S. government’s organizational failures prior to, and during, World War II
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regulatory activity from the APA’s procedural requirements.105
While the organic statutes establishing domestic agencies such as
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the SEC, and
the EPA defined agencies’ missions in broad terms, the National
Security Act of 1947 is the most vague organic statute of them all,
vesting the CIA, the NSA, and the NSC with little more than
simple mandates to gather intelligence for the purpose of
protecting national security.106 The Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), which has long conducted a substantial
portion of national security activities, has had no statutory
mandate to do so for most of its history.107 These agencies
operated with minimal oversight until the 1970s, when Congress
finally began to intervene to regulate intelligence collection.108
Moreover, when the national security state engages in the
use of force, the source and scope of its mandate to do so has
typically been even murkier.109 The President may order the use
influenced the design of the National Security Act). See ZEGART, supra note 63,
at 1719 (providing an overview of the new institutionalism theory of
bureaucracy).
105. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (2012) (stating that notice-and-comment
requirements apply to rulemaking “except to the extent that there is involved a
military or foreign affairs function of the United States”); see Knowles, supra
note 57, at 919–32 (discussing the legislative history of, and historical context
for, the APA’s national security exceptions); Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian
Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1096 (2009) (describing “black and
gray holes” in Administrative Law that enable Executive discretion during
emergencies).
106. See Rascoff, supra note 70, at 699 (“[A]lthough Congress initially
regulated the intelligence community with an exceedingly light touch—the
CIA’s organic law is breathtakingly short on detail . . . .”).
107. See id. at 700 (“[T]he FBI lacks a basic legislative charter
altogether . . . .”); Dalal, supra note 99, at 7071 (“[T]he FBI gradually expanded
its mission from strictly federal law enforcement, to domestic intelligence
gathering for wartime national security, and finally to domestic intelligence
gathering to preserve social and political order within the United States.”).
108. Zachary K. Goldman and Samuel J. Rascoff, Introduction—The New
Intelligence Oversight, in GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT xvii, xvii (Zachary K.
Goldman & Samuel J. Rascoff eds., 2015).
109. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jean Galbraith, Presidential War Powers As an
Interactive Dynamic: International Law, Domestic Law, and Practice-Based
Legal Change, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 689, 693 (2016) (observing that the interrelated
development of the international and domestic legal regimes governing the use
of force has been practice-based).
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of force in some circumstances without specific statutory
authorization and with minimal congressional involvement.110
Even when Congress explicitly authorizes the use of military
force by statute, it typically grants authority in broad, vague
terms.111 The Uniform Code of Military Justice, with certain
important exceptions, focuses on the internal governance of the
military bureaucracy, rather than the ways in which the military
uses force.112 In general, the national security bureaucracy has
enormous discretion to regulate with the use of force as it sees fit,
so long as it complies with the President’s relevant orders and its
own interpretations of international law.113
As Professor Jonathan Hafetz has observed, the national
security bureaucracy takes these vague grants of authority as
“invitations to develop broad and malleable standards” and “strip
rules of their ordinary meaning, causing their sub rosa
transformation into standards.”114 Unlike rules and standards in
other areas, where agency interpretations are regularly subject to
judicial interpretation and other forms of external scrutiny,
national
security
delegations
of
authority
“resist
particularization” and tend to expand over time.115
Because “much of the study of administrative law has
focused on formal authority, at the expense of actual or effective

110. See id. at 691 (“Even though the Constitution assigns to Congress the
power to declare war, as well as a variety of other powers relating to war,
presidents have on numerous occasions initiated the use of military force
without obtaining specific congressional authorization.”).
111. See Scott M. Sullivan, Interpreting Force Authorization, 43 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 241, 242 (2015) (“They [AUMFs] explode into the legal landscape with
supernova intensity, briefly outshine the broader legal constellation and, at
their birth, are bound only by the functional concerns surrounding armed
conflict.”).
112. See McNeal, supra note 25, at 761 (detailing how accountability and
punishment operate under the Uniform Code of Military Justice).
113. See id. at 763 (“The process [of targeted killing] is unaccountable
because the killings are beyond the reach of courts, making Executive Branch
officials ‘judge, jury[,] and executioner.’”).
114. Hafetz, supra note 97, at 2144.
115. Id.; see also Dalal, supra note 99, at 132 (remarking that scholars have
cautioned about the growing power of unfettered executive discretion in matters
of national security).
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power,”116 such malleable and expanding grants of formal
authority contributed to administrative law scholars neglecting
the national security bureaucracy. In addition, because
Congress’s more recent specific statutory interventions, since
FISA, sought to either expand or restrain existing discretion,117 it
was natural for legal scholars to focus on how external
constraints might limit agency discretion in the national security
realm, rather than the equally important question of how and
why that discretion is empowered and constituted.118 In other
words, administrative law scholarship has been working almost
exclusively within the regulated-war-machine paradigm.
D. The Structure of the National Security Bureaucracy
Two unusual structural features of the national security
bureaucracy also make the regulated-war-machine paradigm
initially attractive. The first feature is that bureaucracy’s sheer
size and complexity. No other area of government activity is
populated by so many nested agencies with intricate
relationships of authority.119 The Director of National Intelligence
116. Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 215 (2015).
117. See, e.g., USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 11423, 129 Stat.
268 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1842 (2012)) (imposing some new limits on the bulk
collection of telecommunication metadata on U.S. citizens by American
intelligence agencies); 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (2012) (lowering the standard for
obtaining internet metadata so that the FBI need only certify to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) that the information likely to be obtained
is “relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against international
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities”); 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012) (the
so-called “business records” provision); 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a) (2012) (allowing the
government to acquire foreign intelligence by obtaining the content of
communications by non-U.S. persons “reasonably believed” to be outside U.S.
borders, and interpreted to authorize the collection of phone and Internet
content of Americans in the process).
118. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law
in the Gilded Age, 119 YALE L.J. 1362, 1470 (2010) (“Forgetting that
administrative law both constitutes and empowers administrative action at the
same time that it structures and constrains administrative behavior,
administrative law is often thought of as just that set of external constraints
that limit agency discretion.”).
119. See LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COSTS OF COUNTERTERRORISM: POWER,
POLITICS, AND LIBERTY 11 (2008) (explaining the expansion of the executive’s
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(DNI), for example, is the titular “head” of the intelligence
community and responsible for coordinating intelligence
gathering across hundreds of agencies.120 However, the DNI
possesses little actual authority to control those agencies.121 The
fragmenting of authority frustrates oversight and public
participation in these agencies’ activities.122
The second unusual feature of the national security
bureaucracy is the proliferation of mandates with a high degree
of overlap—so many agencies and sub-agencies tasked with
accomplishing the same or similar missions.123 This overlap
creates a close-knit bureaucratic environment prone to both
unusually intense agency competition and unusually frequent
opportunities for close cooperation when agencies’ immediate
goals align.124
These features make the national security bureaucracy
resemble, in some ways, a marketplace.125 Indeed, a fruitful
authority regarding issues of national security and counterterrorism). See
generally Jean Tirole, Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion
in Organizations, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 181 (1986) (describing different types of
bureaucratic structures).
120. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458, § 1011, 118 Stat. 3638 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403 (1)(a) (2012)).
121. See John D. Negroponte & Edward M. Wittenstein, Urgency,
Opportunity, and Frustration: Implementing the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 379, 388 (2010) (“[The
IRPTA is] a consensus piece of legislation that created a DNI position with
broad responsibilities but only vague authorities in critical respects.”).
122. See DICKINSON, supra note 27, at 107 (observing that outsourcing
“significantly worsens” these problems).
123. See ZEGART, supra note 63, at 23 (“Whereas domestic policy agencies
tend to have discrete jurisdictions, foreign policy agencies intersect, overlap, and
interact.”).
124. See id. at 37 (“[N]ational security agencies live in a much more tightly
knit, stable bureaucratic world than their domestic policy counterparts.”); Sales,
supra note 70, at 28586 (explaining how the “wall” between intelligence
officials and criminal investigations demonstrates why administrative agencies
do not readily share information with one another).
125. The classic model of a market is a decentralized, atomistic process in
which individual firms conduct innumerable transactions to produce, in the
aggregate, an inadvertent social result. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT
ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
98 (1994). However, actual markets may have small numbers of firms with
long-term relationships who conduct transactions intending a particular
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branch of recent administrative law scholarship has zeroed in on
the ways agencies (both inside and outside the national security
state) interact.126 These analyses often use market models to
depict agency behavior—reinforcing the influence of the
regulated-war-machine paradigm.
E. Limited Judicial Review
Another significant reason for the dominance of the
regulated-war-machine paradigm is the limited role of the courts
in national security matters. Legal analysts have typically begun
examining regulatory action by agencies where it is most
accessible—through the lens of judicial review.127 But largely for
the reasons discussed above, U.S. courts have historically been
reluctant to review the government’s national security
activities.128 Courts have relied on several doctrines—political
question,129 standing,130 immunity,131 and the state secrets
aggregate result. Id. at 99; see Sales, supra note 70, at 282–83 (analogizing
national security agency actions to private firms protecting trade secrets).
126. See, e.g., Sales, supra note 70, at 28283 (describing the various
“analytical frameworks” through which administrative law scholars are
studying agency actions with regard to information “hoarding”); see Renan,
supra note 116, at 213 (“Through pooling, the executive augments capacity by
mixing and matching resources dispersed across the bureaucracy.”); Eric Biber,
The More the Merrier: Multiple Agencies and the Future of Administrative Law
Scholarship, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 78, 7883 (2012) (examining the new focus on
agency interactions in administrative law scholarship).
127. See Nestor M. Davidson & Ethan J. Leib, Regleprudenceat OIRA and
Beyond, 103 GEO. L.J. 259, 26162 (2015) (observing that OIRA is not subject to
judicial review).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
329 (1936) (prescribing exceptional deference to executive branch claims in
foreign affairs); see Chesney, supra note 99, at 1362 (discussing the weight of
“factual deference” in national security claims); William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of
Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083,
1099–101 (2008) (describing exceptional national security deference); Vermeule,
supra note 105, at 1097 (describing the ways in which courts scale back scrutiny
during emergencies). But see Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The
Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1901 (2015)
(arguing that this form of exceptionalism is fading).
129. See Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV.
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privilege,132 among others—to avoid reviewing exercises of agency
discretion. When courts have engaged in review, they typically
have given exceptional deference to the national security state on
matters of both fact and law.133
These factors—the fundamental necessity of national
security activities, the nature of traditional warfare, vague
mandates, and judicial deference—have not operated in isolation.
They are mutually reinforcing, which makes national security
regulatory activities seem especially difficult to depict and
analyze. For example, Congress, with modes of traditional
warfare in mind, gives agencies conducting national security
activities broad and vague mandates, while also exempting those
activities from the procedural requirements imposed on the rest
of the administrative state.134 The national security bureaucracy,
operating in secret and not burdened by the APA’s procedural
requirements—which were designed to ensure deliberation and
public participation in regulatory activities—need not, and does
not, produce a record suitable for meaningful judicial review.135
941, 941 (2004) (“This Article attempts to explain and justify the exceptional
treatment that courts accord foreign affairs issues under the political question
doctrine.”).
130. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 568 U.S. 398, 402 (2013) (holding that a
group of U.S. reporters, attorneys, activists, and workers lacked standing to
challenge the constitutionality of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA)).
131. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Rights Without Remedies: The Newfound
National Security Exception to Bivens, 28 A.B.A. NAT’L SEC. L. REP. 1, 4 (2006)
(“[B]ecause of the qualified immunity doctrine, federal officers are seldom held
directly liable even where courts do find a Bivens remedy.”).
132. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1093
(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (dismissing, under the state secrets doctrine, foreign
nationals’ claims of harm caused by the CIA’s extraordinary rendition program).
133. See Chesney, supra note 99, at 136685 (detailing numerous instances
of national security fact deference in judicial decisions post-9/11); Eskridge &
Baer, supra note 128, at 1099101 (cataloguing the Supreme Court’s various
deference regimes); Vermeule, supra note 105, at 109899 (arguing for greater
examination of the lower federal courts’ showing deference to administrative
agency action pertaining to national security matters post-9/11).
134. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (contemplating what
“effective accountability” measures would look like that increase participation
and transparency).
135. See Stephen F. Williams, “Hybrid Rulemaking” Under the
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The courts, without clear statutory principles against which to
evaluate the legality of agency action or a useful record, and
believing in the unique expertise of national security
bureaucrats, shy away from reviewing agency decision-making in
the national security realm. And the national security
bureaucrats, in turn, without significant judicial (or
congressional) scrutiny, have few incentives to alter their
regulatory processes to make them accessible or susceptible to
judicial review. And so on.
Since World War II, the national security state has operated
under these conditions, except when some exogenous shock—
Watergate, 9/11—has caused serious re-thinking and efforts to
impose more oversight.136 But this oversight was always
conceived of as an attempt to alter the national security state’s
behavior without disturbing the regulated-war-machine
paradigm.
III. Regulating National Security Bureaucracy
However, most of the factors discussed above, which led to
the current dominance of the regulated-war-machine paradigm,
are not permanent.137 They are, in fact, becoming less and less
salient. The last wave of globalization did much to blur the
distinctions between the foreign and the domestic—distinctions
that had given the government’s national security activities their
Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L.
REV. 401, 456 (1975) (“[Courts] may demand that agencies develop a record that
enables a reviewing court to find an intelligible answer for each substantial
challenge posed.”).
136. See BOBBITT, supra note 55, at 248 (discussing the unconstitutional
executive practices pre-Watergate); Dalal, supra note 99, at 78 (observing that
revelations in the early 1970s about widespread national security-related
abuses of power forced the nation “into a national dialogue about the
constitutional boundaries of executive power . . . and the appropriateness of
domestic intelligence gathering”).
137. See Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the Foreign Affairs
Constitution, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 127 (2009) (“[I]t is evident that in today’s
topsy-turvy world governments can topple and relationships can change in a
moment.” (quoting Nat'l Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d
551, 554–56 (2d Cir. 1988))).
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most compelling claim to uniqueness.138 Also as a result of
globalization, the nature of warfare has changed in fundamental
ways so that it looks much more like what we have always
conceived of as regulation.139 And surprisingly, the unique
bureaucratic features of the national security state make it easier
to construct a simple model of how it regulates than agencies
regulating in other areas.
In the first subpart below, I describe the political,
technological, and legal changes that have created fertile ground
for a shift to a warfare-as-regulation paradigm. In the second
subpart, I describe this new paradigm and explain its advantages
over the predominant regulated-war-machine paradigm.
A. Laying the Groundwork for the Warfare-as-Regulation
Paradigm
1. The Expanding Scope of National Security
The distinction in law and policy between the foreign and the
domestic—and between what is and is not “national security”—is
fading.140 Because people, products, and information cross
national borders as never before, national security concerns
continue to expand to new areas of government policymaking.141
138. See id. at 127 (2009) (“[D]rawing a sharp distinction between domestic
and foreign relations issues creates boundary problems . . . .”).
139. See BOBBITT, supra note 55, at 178–79 (quoting Henry Kissinger’s
observation that the wars against non-state actors “signal . . . an inevitable
transformation of the international order resulting from changes in the internal
structure of many key participants, and from the democratization of politics, the
globalization of economics, and the instantaneousness of communications”).
140. See Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations
Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1258 (2007) (observing that “the explosion of
international lawmaking, economic globalization, transnational flows of people,
and transborder information flows occasioned by the transformation of
communications technology . . . [have] radically increased the number of cases
[in U.S. courts] that directly implicate foreign relations”).
141. See Ivo H. Daalder & James M. Lindsay, The Globalization of Politics:
American Foreign Policy for a New Century, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Jan. 1,
2013), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-globalization-of-politics-americanforeign-policy-for-a-new-century/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2017) (“Globalization is
not just an economic phenomenon, but a political, cultural, military, and
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The gravest security threats come primarily from small groups
and individuals, rather than nation-states.142 In response,
government more closely monitors the public to learn about and
stop these threats.143 In the era of high-tech global surveillance, a
mere search algorithm can determine the difference, for a U.S.
agency, between what is foreign and domestic.144 These changes
have led to increasing entanglement of the government’s national
security activities with the lives of ordinary Americans.145
With the expansion of national security regulating into
previously “domestic” domains, its concentrated costs are being
imposed, with greater frequency, on American citizens and
individuals inside the United States.146 These costs include not
only the appropriation of private information,147 but also, for
certain targeted communities, the higher costs associated with
greater scrutiny of their activities, infiltration by government
agents, and even detention.148
environmental one as well.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
142. See Huq, supra note 70, at 908 (describing the shift from “state-based
enemies” to “new threats in the more fragmented international environment”).
143. See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1934, 1938 (2013) (observing that democracies have “invested heavily in
surveillance technologies in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in
America, the London subway bombings of 2005, and other atrocities”).
144. See William C. Banks, Programmatic Surveillance and FISA: Of
Needles in Haystacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1633, 1634 (2010) (“Instead of building
toward an individual FISA application by developing leads on
individuals[,] . . . officials now develop algorithms that search thousands or even
millions of collected e-mail messages and telephone calls for indications of
suspicious activities.”).
145. See id. at 1635 (“[M]ore Americans than ever are engaged in
international communications, and there is far greater intelligence interest in
communications to and from Americans. Both circumstances increase the
likelihood that the government will be intercepting communications of innocent
Americans . . . .”).
146. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the
Administrative State: 9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1613, 1678 (2009) (observing that “every government action is
redistributive; the 9/11 response had different effects on Muslim Americans and
on other Americans”).
147. See Derek E. Bambauer, Privacy Versus Security, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 667, 678 (2013) (observing that firms retain consumer data
because of the costs associated with destroying it).
148. See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND
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2. The Changing Nature of Warfare

As I discussed above, traditional warfare—its clashing
armies and total-war modes—is hard to model as regulation. But
these modes of warfare are quite rare today.149 “Kill-capture” is
still part of the strategy for defeating non-state, terrorist,
enemies.150 Yet without a uniformed military to target or an
easily-identifiable battlefield, kill-capture requires the U.S.
national security bureaucracy to expend considerable resources in
intelligence gathering and deliberation simply to identify the
enemy and, once identified, decide whether he is worth targeting
or capturing.151 This process is an individualized determination, a
“quasi-adjudicative” one.152 In other words, the process is a form
of agency adjudication.
With enemy responsibility individuated,153 “kill-capture”
looks very much like—in fact is—a form of regulation. More
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 22–46 (2003) (describing
the federal government’s preventative detention campaign targeting Muslim
Americans that ensued after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001); Tom
R. Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer & Aziz Z. Huq, Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects
in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 365, 369 (2010) (explaining that Muslim Americans cooperate with law
enforcement in an effort to avoid intrusive policing strategies, such as intensive
frisks and detention).
149. See SITARAMAN, supra note 87, at 1 (“Rather [than traditional warfare],
insurgents hibernate in the shadows, emerging only when ready for devastating
attack . . . .”).
150. See BOBBITT, supra note 55, at 18 (observing in 2008 that the U.S.
strategy was “to kill or capture the terrorists before a catastrophic attack
happens”).
151. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 20, at 1524 (“[T]he government is
individuating the responsibility of specific enemies and targeting only those
engaged in specific acts or employed in specific roles.”); McNeal, supra note 25,
at 684 (“Bureaucrats help create lists of people to be killed . . . . The process is
called targeted killing . . . .”).
152. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 20, at 1560; (discussing the
Detention Review Board’s procedures once an enemy combatant is detained);
Stephen Vladeck, Targeted Killing and Judicial Review, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
11, 26 (2014) (“[T]he U.S. [is] increasingly moving toward a paradigm in which
the use of force is based upon individualized determinations made thousands of
miles away from any battlefield utilizing secret and otherwise unreviewable
criteria.”).
153. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 20, at 1527 (“[I]t is difficult to
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generally, warfare has become suffused with legality:
commanders, with assistance from omnipresent judge advocates,
must constantly apply complex sets of legal rules when planning
operations and engaging the enemy.154 Law enforcement—the
traditional regulatory means for addressing individuated
responsibility that triggers serious legal consequences—works
alongside the national security bureaucracy to such an extent
that warfare is becoming more like law enforcement, and law
enforcement more like warfare.155
Moreover, as scholars have documented, years of experience
in Iraq and Afghanistan have reminded the national security
bureaucracy that “kill-capture” is often an inadequate strategy,
by itself, for defeating a terrorist enemy.156 The focus of U.S.
know that an individual is part of a terrorist organization on any basis other
than his own individual acts of terrorism.”).
154. See Michael L. Kramer & Michael N. Schmitt, Lawyers on Horseback?
Thoughts on Judge Advocates and Civil-Military Relations, 55 UCLA L. REV.
1407, 1423–24 (2008) (“In contemporary U.S. operations, judge advocates are
fully integrated members of military staffs. The senior judge advocate assigned
to a unit serves as a personal advisor to the commander, ensuring that the
commander receives sufficient timely and accurate advice to conduct operations
in accordance with law and policy.”); U.S. AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOC.
3-60, TARGETING, 95 (2006) (defining the “Role of the Judge Advocate” to include
“an affirmative duty to provide legal advice to commanders and their staffs that
is consistent with the international and domestic legal obligations”). Lawyers
are increasingly present in every aspect of the government’s national security
activities. See Schlanger, supra note 21, at 118 (“Intelligence legalism brings
lawyers’ rule-of-law commitment into the realm of national security . . . .”).
155. See Gabriella Blum & Philip Heymann, Law and Policy of Targeted
Killing, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 145, 148 (2010) (“[T]he fact that all targeted
killing operations in combating terrorism are directed against particular
individuals makes the tactic more reminiscent of a law enforcement paradigm,
where power is employed on the basis of individual guilt rather than status
(civilian/combatant).”); John T. Parry, Terrorism and the New Criminal Process,
15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 767 (2007) (“[W]ar has changed in its functions,
to become more like policing, [and] that policing too has changed, to become
more like war.”); Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the
Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079,
1081 (2008) (arguing that the traditional criminal model and the traditional
military model have converged in the context of counterterrorism detention
efforts).
156. Counterinsurgency strategy, or COIN, was a key feature of U.S.
military strategy long before 9/11. See SITARAMAN, supra note 87, at 5
(“[Counterinsurgency operations] include killing and capturing insurgents and
also reconciling with them, arming local militias and also training state-run
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military policy has focused more and more on the progressive
branch of counterinsurgency strategy—a mode of warfare that
seeks to incapacitate the enemy by undermining its support
among the people it depends on for resources.157 Progressive
counterinsurgency holds that kill-capture may do more harm
than good because it causes “destruction that creates backlash
among the population and fuels their support for the
insurgency.”158 The progressive counterinsurgent instead
attempts to build popular support by shoring up the rule of law
and essential services, “ensuring civilian security,” and, if
necessary, revising public policies or even a nation’s basic law.159
Progressive counterinsurgency strategy and traditional
domestic regulation are so similar that the former qualifies as a
type of regulation. Like domestic regulation, counterinsurgency is
“a set of interventions, those policies that society uses to
structure the interactions and behaviors of its people.”160 Both are
concerned with striking the correct balance between technocratic
effectiveness and accommodating political interests.161 And the
weapons in the progressive counterinsurgent’s arsenal closely
resemble—indeed, overlap with—the key features of effective
traditional
domestic
regulation.
The
progressive
counterinsurgency must establish legitimacy by complying with
the sources of, and limits to, its own authority—its domestic law
security forces, working with local power brokers and rooting out corruption.”).
157. See id. at 66–67 (discussing counterinsurgency forces’ utilization on a
“win-the-population strategy”); DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-24,
INSURGENCIES AND COUNTERING INSURGENCIES v (2014) [hereinafter
COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL] (“Provid[ing] a doctrinal foundation for
counterinsurgency.”).
158. SITARAMAN, supra note 87; see also COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL,
supra note 157, at 1–31 (“[I]f a population does not see outside forces as
legitimate, this can undermine the legitimacy of the host-nation government
trying to counter an insurgency.”).
159. SITARAMAN, supra note 87, at 38.
160. Id. at 18.
161. See id. at 6 (discussing whether counterinsurgency is a “technocratic
enterprise” or “policy choice”); Rascoff, supra note 70, at 644 (viewing the
concern that presidential control will “politicize” intelligence “as a species of
concern that overhangs all administrative law: how to strike the right balance
between technocratic detachment and expertise on the one hand, and political
control on the other”).
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and international law.162 It must make rule-of-law development
accessible to popular participation.163 It must be as transparent
as possible.164 And once it has established a strong and legitimate
rule of law, it may need to maintain it by punishing individuals
or entities who refuse to comply.165
One fundamental aspect of traditional warfare that remains
salient, however, is secrecy.166 Overclassification of national
security information has been a serious problem for decades,

162. See COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 157, at 13-1
(outlining the sources of legal authority for U.S. counterinsurgency efforts);
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 171 (3d ed. 1991) (observing that the
doctrine of ultra vires “is the root principle of administrative power. The statute
is the source of agency authority as well as of its limits”); Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 462–63 (2003) (describing “concern
for administrative arbitrariness . . . [as] an important obstacle to agency
legitimacy”); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2012) (authorizing a reviewing court
to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to
be . . . in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right”).
163. See SITARAMAN, supra note 87, at 14 (“When it comes to building the
rule of law . . . counterinsurgents must focus . . . on supporting institutions that
work at the local level . . . .”); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1670 (1975) (“Increasingly, the
function of administrative law is . . . the provision of a surrogate political
process to ensure the fair representation of a wide range of affected interests in
the process of administrative decision.”).
164. See SITARAMAN, supra note 87, at 16 (positing that counterinsurgency
efforts should be both legally and sociologically legitimate by following processes
that are “transparent” and “fair”); Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability
and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2075 (2005)
(“[T]rue accountability, in the realm of law and politics, involves many of the
features that are central to the administrative state and that people find so
unattractive about it—hierarchy, monitoring, reporting, internal rules,
investigations, and job evaluations.”).
165. See SITARAMAN, supra note 87, at 20 (concluding that counterinsurgency
strategy, once established, enables the host-state to “fight and punish criminals
and insurgents”); Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory
Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1344 (2013)
(justifying the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs assertion of control
over agency decision making).
166. See PRIEST & ARKIN, supra note 4, at 86–87 (discussing the
predominance of the U.S. government’s intelligence gathering in the War on
Terror).
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despite attempts at reform.167 Since September 11, the number of
government employees and contractors with security clearances
and the number of documents—including agency rules—that
were subject to some form of classification grew dramatically.168
Nonetheless, the secrecy pandemic in the national security
bureaucracy is not inconsistent with the warfare-as-regulation
paradigm. As Daniel Patrick Moynihan observed, government
secrecy is itself a form of regulation.169 Likewise, there may be
more method than madness behind the massive, regular leakage
of classified national security information—that phenomenon,
too, is a form of regulation.170 And even while the national
security bureaucracy’s penchant for secrecy has grown unabated,
its capacity to keep secrets may be diminishing.171
3. Declining Judicial Deference
Courts’ reluctance to scrutinize the national security state’s
activities has historically contributed to the difficulty of modeling
those activities as regulation.172 However, since the end of the
167. See id. at 80–81 (describing the “indiscriminate overproduction” of data
that renders intelligence difficult for government agencies to use).
168. See id. at 86 (“[Arkin] discovered that 263 of these organizations had
been established or refashioned in the wake of 9/11.”).
169. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 94, at 59 (“Secrecy is a form of regulation.”).
170. See David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government
Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L.
REV. 512, 514–16 (2013) (describing the “regulatory regime applicable to
leaking” as “an intricate ecosystem” in which the informal tolerance of leaking
serves executive and bureaucratic purposes); Rascoff, supra note 70, at 687
(labeling “selective disclosure” of classified information “a form of regulation”).
171. See Mark Fenster, The Implausibility of Secrecy, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 309,
316 n.30 (2013) (“[L]egal and bureaucratic systems of control fail
and . . . information can and will escape in a myriad of ways . . . .”); Peter Swire,
The Declining Half-Life of Secrets and the Future of Signals Intelligence, at 3
(New
Am.
Cybersecurity
Fellows,
Paper
Ser.
No.
1,
2015),
https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/4425-the-declining-half-life-ofsecrets/Swire_DecliningHalfLifeOfSecrets.f8ba7c96a6c049108dfa85b5f79024d8.pdf (arguing that secrets
have a “declining half-life” and that intelligence agencies should be prepared for
their activities to be revealed to the public).
172. See supra Part I.E (discussing the legal doctrines that restrict judicial
review of national security matters).
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Cold War and the last wave of globalization, and continuing
through the post-9/11 period, the U.S. Supreme Court has shown
an increased willingness, in some situations, to review those
activities and give less deference to the national security state’s
legal and factual determinations.173 In doing so, it has limited the
scope of earlier, more deferential, precedent.174
In Zivotofsky v. Clinton,175 for example, the Court rejected
the government’s argument that the political question doctrine
barred courts from deciding whether U.S. citizens born in
Jerusalem may designate their birthplace on U.S. passports as
“Israel” or “Jerusalem.”176 Similarly, in Bond v. United States
(Bond I)177 the Court recognized an individual’s standing to
challenge, on Tenth Amendment grounds, a statute
implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention.178 And in
several other recent cases, the Court has declined to apply
extraordinary deference to the President’s and agencies’
interpretations of treaties and statutes on issues deeply
implicating foreign affairs and national security.179
173. Compare, e.g., Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 128, at 1924
(discussing the Roberts Court’s rejection of the political question doctrine in
recent cases), and Deborah N. Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the
Judicial Power for Foreign Relations Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 783, 785 (2011)
(citing a number of recent Supreme Court decisions that embrace judicial review
of international law issues, including national security), with Curtis A. Bradley,
Foreign Relations Law and the Purported Shift Away from “Exceptionalism”,
128 HARV. L. REV. F. 294, 294 (2015) (disagreeing with the scholarship that
posits that the Roberts Court increasingly treats international law cases like
“run-of-the-mill” domestic law cases).
174. See Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 128, at 1902 (noting the historical
norm that the judiciary defers to the political branches of government on issues
of international law).
175. 566 U.S. 189 (2012).
176. Id. at 194.
177. 564 U.S. 211 (2011).
178. Id. at 225–26.
179. See Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2258 (2014)
(affirming the lower court’s decision that Argentina’s foreign assets are not
immune from discovery under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); Bond v.
United States (Bond II), 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2081–82 (2014) (holding that a treaty
about chemical warfare and terrorism does not reach local criminal defendants);
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1665 (2013) (concluding
that there is a presumption against extraterritoriality with respect to granting

1990

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1953 (2017)

But the Court’s most striking departure from its past
deference occurred in the quartet of Guantanamo cases.180 Most
significantly, in Boumediene v. Bush,181 the Court rejected the
executive branch’s foreign policy arguments, and bucked
Congress as well, to restore the norm of habeas review.182 In
doing so, the Court pointedly declined to defer to the executive
branch’s factual assessments of military necessity.183
Moreover, the Court’s refusal to defer to Executive Branch
legal and factual determinations in the Guantanamo cases
altered national security policy. After Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,184 the
Department of Defense (DOD) established a process, the
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), for making an
individual determination about the enemy combatant status of all
detainees at Guantanamo.185 After the Court recognized statutory
habeas jurisdiction there, Congress passed the Detainee

aliens jurisdiction in U.S. federal courts under the Alien Tort Statute); Morrison
v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010) (“[A]pply[ing] the
presumption [against extraterritoriality] in all cases,” including suits that arise
under Securities Exchange Commission regulations); Medellín v. Texas, 552
U.S. 491, 498–99 (2008) (holding that an International Court of Justice decision
was not domestically enforceable).
180. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 730 (2008) (holding that
Congress’s attempt to eliminate habeas corpus for accused non-citizen enemy
combatants at Guantanamo Bay was unconstitutional); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
548 U.S. 557, 624 (2006) (declaring unlawful the military commissions
established to try certain enemy combatants for war crimes); Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466, 484 (2004) (holding that alien detainees at Guantanamo had a
statutory right to invoke habeas jurisdiction); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,
509 (2004) (holding that citizen-detainees possessed the right to challenge their
detention using habeas).
181. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
182. See id. at 771 (“If the privilege of habeas corpus is to be denied to the
detainees now before us, Congress must act in accordance with the
requirements of the Suspension Clause.”).
183. See id. at 727 (“The Constitution grants Congress and the President the
power to acquire, dispose of, and govern territory, not the power to decide when
and where its terms apply.”).
184. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
185. See Kent Roach & Gary Trotter, Miscarriages of Justice in the War
Against Terror, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 967, 1015–16 (2005) (observing critical due
process defects in the CSRTs, but noting that the order establishing them was
“inspired” by Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Hamdi).
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Treatment Act,186 establishing direct judicial review of CSRT
determinations in lieu of habeas.187 Similarly, after the Court
declared the military commissions unlawful in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld,188 the Administration was obligated to seek
congressional approval for commissions that restored some of the
rights afforded at courts martial.189 The ruling also altered
interrogation policy, compelling the government to acknowledge
the application of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions,190 which prompted closure of CIA black sites. And
overall, these judicial interventions helped trigger a shift away
from capture altogether and toward an emphasis on targeted
killing.191
This decline in deference, however nascent and sporadic,192
has been driven in part by the Court’s recognizing the
developments noted above—the dissolving boundaries between
domestic and foreign affairs, and the changing, differentiated
nature of warfare.193 If this trend continues, it would provide
186. Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739, 2739–44 (2005) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
187. The DTA review process was held by the Supreme Court in Boumediene
to be an inadequate substitute for habeas, and quickly fell into disuse.
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 728.
188. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
189. See Jack M. Balkin, Hamdan as a Democracy-Forcing Decision,
BALKINIZATION
(June
29,
2006,
1:07
PM),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/06/hamdan-as-democracy-forcing-decision.html
(last visited Nov. 12, 2017) (describing how Article 36 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice forces the president to seek congressional approval before
creating specialized military tribunals) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
190. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 563 (“Common Article 3’s requirements are
general, crafted to accommodate a wide variety of legal systems, but they are
requirements nonetheless.”).
191. See Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held? Military Detention Through
the Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. L. REV. 769, 804 (2011) [hereinafter Chesney, Who May
Be Held?] (concluding that the scrutiny of U.S. military detention via habeas
proceedings led to a dramatic increase in drones strikes as a means of
incapacitating enemies); Crandall, supra note 73, at 598 (arguing that the
increased use of targeted killing was an unintended consequence of courts’
limiting authority over military detention).
192. See Bradley, supra note 173, at 297 (arguing that a trend in
international law toward “normalization” has not been established).
193. See supra notes 138–142 and accompanying text (noting changes in the
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more fertile soil for developing a body of administrative law
regarding warfare-as-regulation.194
B. The Warfare-as-Regulation Paradigm and its Advantages
The developments discussed above make constructing a
warfare-as-regulation paradigm a viable and useful project, even
if it would not have been a generation ago. Yet the fact remains
that the national security state has always regulated. It has a
long history of intervention in the private domain, both at home
and abroad—through conscription, occupation, surveillance, and
other activities. What has changed is only the degree and scope of
the intervention. The warfare-as-regulation paradigm opens up
the mysterious war machine to reveal the regulatory mechanisms
that have always existed within.
As with domestic agencies, the most important questions
about the national security state’s regulating concern, not only its
compliance with legal authority, but its effectiveness and
efficiency. Is it regulating less or more than necessary to
successfully manage risks to the United States, its citizens, and
its interests abroad? Is it regulating through the most efficient
means?
In the domestic context, the degree of regulation is typically
measured by the financial costs it imposes on regulated entities—
businesses and individuals.195 But regulation also implicates
many costs that are harder to measure—such as human life,
health, liberty, and happiness.196
nature of warfare and the subsequent expansion of presidential authority). For
analysis attributing the Court’s lack of deference in the Guantanamo cases to its
recognition that the U.S. plays a unique geopolitical leadership role, see
Knowles, supra note 138, at 782. For alternative explanations for the outcomes
in these cases, see generally Bradley, supra note 173.
194. See Hafetz, supra note 97, at 2144–45 (arguing that national security
law fits within the broader category of administrative law).
195. See Richard G. Morgan & James H. Holt, Measuring the Costs of
Regulation, 59 TEX. L. REV. 623, 623–24 (reviewing PAUL W. MACAVOY,
MEASURING THE COSTS OF REGULATION: THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES AND THE
ECONOMY (1979), and agreeing with his approach to evaluating the efficacy of
regulation through economic analysis).
196. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON
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In the national security context, the simplest way to measure
the degree of regulation is by examining the degree of force or
coercion that the government applies. For example, how many
will be killed from the use of lethal force? What is the value of the
property that will be destroyed? How long will detainees be
deprived of liberty? How coercive will interrogation methods be?
How intrusive will surveillance or border screening be?
But like its domestic counterparts, the national security
bureaucracy’s regulating also imposes costs that are more
difficult to measure.197 How should the U.S. government estimate
the value of foreign lives lost?198 Will the number of deaths and
the level of property destruction from targeting operations
demoralize enemy armed groups or instead build support for
those groups?199 Will scrutinizing Muslim communities in the
U.S. increase or decrease cooperation with law enforcement?200
Will regulating foreign citizens through the use of force increase
or diminish U.S. “soft power”?201
An accurate regulatory model of national security activities
should depict the true costs and benefits of a regulatory method—
e.g., targeted killing operations using drones or military
detention at Guantanamo—by comparing it to the costs of
KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 9 (2005)
(“[T]here is no reason to think that the right answers will emerge from the
strange process of assigning dollar values to human life, human health, and
nature itself, and then crunching the numbers.”).
197. See, e.g., Arden Rowell & Lesley Wexler, Valuing Foreign Lives, 48 GA.
L. REV. 499, 502 (2014) (exploring “the question of how a government should
allocate domestic resources for foreign benefit” and identifying it as “a discrete
analytical category”).
198. See id. at 554 (arguing for a comprehensive approach to the valuation of
foreign lives).
199. See id. at 541 (“[S]tates may benefit from complying with or exceeding
their international valuation obligations by winning the hearts and minds of
other populations.”).
200. See Tyler, Schulhofer & Huq, supra note 148, at 388–89 (concluding
that whether Muslim Americans believe law enforcement treats them fairly
“influence[s] cooperation in the successful accomplishment of counterterrorism
goals”).
201. See JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD
POLITICS x (explaining that soft power “is the ability to get what you want
through . . . the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and
policies”).
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regulating through other means or not regulating at all.202 This
cost-benefit analysis should reveal whether the regulatory model
efficiently accomplishes the goal of managing risk.203
Indeed, some weighing of costs and benefits is a feature of
international law principles governing national security
activities.204 Under core principles of international humanitarian
law, for example, military commanders planning lethal
operations must conduct a proportionality analysis—they must
determine whether the degree of force they use is justified, given
the military necessity and the risk of collateral harm.205
Accurately weighing costs and benefits of regulation in the
national
security
context
is
difficult.
Yet
the
warfare-as-regulation paradigm has several advantages over the
regulated-war-machine paradigm—whether the objective is to
reduce costs for the United States government and its taxpayers,
to ensure better compliance with domestic and international law,
or to discourage the overreliance on modes of warfare with longterm harmful consequences.206
First, viewing warfare as regulation ties together several
developments that, to this point, lack a cohesive explanatory
model. The first is the well-founded concern that national
security activities are insufficiently protective of individual rights
202. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (summarizing literature
about regulators’ goal of mitigating risk).
203. See DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 55, at 878 (critiquing scholarship
that analyzes common fallacies of cost-benefit analysis in administrative law).
204. See Amos N. Guiora, Targeted Killing: When Proportionality Gets All
Out of Proportion, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 235, 252 (2012) (discussing the
concept of proportionality in the context of national security decision-making).
205. See Protocol Additional for the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art.
51(5)(b), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]
(providing that International Humanitarian Law prohibits “an attack which
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”).
206. My working assumption here is that a more accurate weighing of costs
and benefits will, on balance, lead to better compliance with substantive
principles of domestic and international law. I am not arguing, however, that
either U.S. domestic or international law strictly requires the application of the
robust cost-benefit analysis I propose.
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guaranteed by U.S. constitutional and international law.207 The
second is the infusion of legality and lawyers into the process of
war-making.208 The third is the frequent introduction, by analysts
and scholars, of proposed reforms seeking to require more
deliberation, justification, and accuracy in those activities.209 And
the fourth are recent efforts by the President to centralize and
coordinate many national security activities and expose them to
stronger White House control.210
These developments strongly suggest there is a widespread,
if not universal, impression that the national security state
overregulates.211 But that impression should be tested through a
model that maps power dynamics and incentives in the same way
that other models have mapped domestic regulation.
Indeed, the warfare-as-regulation model offers an alternative
method of evaluating reform proposals that is better attuned to
the specific bureaucratic pathologies those proposals are really
intended to address. Scholars and analysts have proposed
numerous procedural reforms to the targeted killing process, such
as adding some form of judicial, inter-agency, congressional, or
intra-agency review.212 These proposals are generally aimed at
requiring better deliberation, improving targeting accuracy, and
ensuring compliance with due process and international law.213
207. See, e.g., Guiora, supra note 204, at 242 (taking issue with U.S.
counterterrorism policy that relies on “ends-based decision making rather than
decision making based on morality and law”).
208. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (describing the role of
judge-advocates within the U.S. military’s judicial process).
209. See, e.g., Matthew Craig, Targeted Killing, Procedure, and False
Legitimation, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2349, 2378–83 (2014) (describing several
proposals for targeted killing procedures).
210. See Rascoff, supra note 70, at 635 (“The tectonic shift toward
presidential control of agencies has reverberated throughout the federal
bureaucracy, including a large swath of the national security state . . . .”).
211. See Michael Jo, Note, National Security Preemption: The Case of
Chemical Safety Regulation, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2065, 2016 (2010) (arguing that
“the reclassification of seemingly domestic regulatory concerns as matters of
national security” expanded the government’s regulatory authority).
212. See Craig, supra note 209, at 2378–83 (summarizing proposals to
reform extrajudicial targeted killing).
213. See id. (describing three particular proposals, but questioning
“whether, and to what degree, different targeting procedures stand to confer
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The problem is that these worthy goals cannot be effectively
pursued without analyzing how and why the targeting
bureaucracy may, or may not, fail to prioritize them. Instead,
reforms become mired in the endless debate about locating the
correct point of balance between vaguely-formulated values of
liberty and security.214
Moreover, it is far too easy for the national security
bureaucrat to claim that it already takes due process values into
account in its decision-making, or to accede to procedural changes
that do little to alter outcomes.215 It may, in other words, offer
merely the veneer of due process by employing “rule of law
tropes”216 that result in “false legitimation.”217
In contrast, a regulatory model that maps bureaucratic
incentives can reveal to the reformer how those incentives may be
channeled, altered or counter-balanced.218 Adjusting bureaucratic
behavior is the shortest path to changing policy.219
Second, the warfare-as-regulation paradigm shifts the focus
of the reform debate from the rights possessed by targets of
national security activities to the sources of authority for those
activities and their effectiveness.220 Most targets and collateral
legitimacy on targeted killing at all”).
214. See RICHARD POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME
OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 31 (2006) (“[O]ne would like to locate . . . the point of
balance [which] shifts continuously as threats to liberty and safety wax and
wane.”); DONOHUE, supra note 119, at 3 (arguing that the “security or freedom
framework” creates the risk that “the true cost” of exercises of counterterrorism
powers “will go uncalculated”).
215. See generally Sinnar, supra note 99 (quoting Attorney General Holder
that due process does not necessitate judicial process).
216. Id. at 1618.
217. See generally Craig, supra note 209 (discussing how the government
can avoid false legitimation in the context of targeted killing).
218. See Note, Judicial Intervention and Organization Theory: Changing
Bureaucratic Behavior and Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 513, 519 (1980) (“To fashion
effective changes in policy and administration, decision-makers must be able to
collect information, assess various alternatives, monitor the implementation
process, and secure the compliance of the targeted bureaucracies.”).
219. See id. at 519 (“The implementation of new policies and procedures
often involves changing the behavior of public bureaucracies . . . .”).
220. See Schlanger, supra note 21, at 118 (“[The] relentless focus on rights
and compliance and law (with a definition of law that includes regulation,
executive orders, court orders, etc.) has obscured the absence of what should be
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victims of the U.S. drone program are “strangers to the
Constitution[:]”221 they have no rights that flow from citizenship,
presence on U.S. territory, or any prior connection to the U.S.222
Although they have rights derived from international law, those
rights are vaguely formulated and often contested, and some may
not apply in wartime.223 The exercise of U.S. national security
authority, by contrast, despite vague statutory grants, actually
involves complex sets of internal rules embedded in a hierarchical
structure.224 Decades of counterinsurgency warfare have
acculturated the military to constantly checking the use of force
against sources of lawful authority.225 Analysis that investigates
and critiques interpretation of that authority is more likely to
alter military practice than explorations of rights that may or
may not apply.226
At the same time, the warfare-as-regulation paradigm
actually focuses more attention on those targets and communities
affected by national security activities because it treats them as
an additional focus on interests, or balancing, or policy.”).
221. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 189 (1996)
(describing efforts to deny constitutional rights to aliens and immigrants inside
the U.S. and U.S. citizens outside U.S. borders and arguing that “no human
being subject to the governance of the United States should be a stranger to the
Constitution”).
222. See Marc D. Falkoff & Robert Knowles, Bagram, Boumediene, and
Limited Government, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 851, 854 (2010) (arguing for a
constitutionally-grounded limited government approach to U.S. national
security activities worldwide, under which the exercise of power will be
constrained regardless of the targeted individual’s entitlement to rights).
223. See Mark V. Vlasic, Assassination & Targeted Killing—A Historical
and Post-Bin Laden Legal Analysis, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 259, 277–81 (discussing
the differences in international and U.S. domestic law on the legality of targeted
killing).
224. See McNeal, supra note 25, at 681–83 (discussing the comprehensive
processes for creating a kill list).
225. See SITARAMAN, supra note 87, at 89 (describing how the U.N. Charter
Article 2(4) that serves as an authority for a state’s use of force affects
counterinsurgency strategy); Robert M. Chesney, Iraq and the Military
Detention Debate: Firsthand Perspectives from the Other War, 2003–2010, 51 VA.
J. INT’L L. 549, 554 (2011) (analyzing legal compliance of military detention
policies from After Action Reports produced by judge-advocates).
226. See Schlanger, supra note 21, at 172 (arguing that gaps in civil liberties
during wartime would be better addressed by governmental entities outside the
NSA).

1998

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1953 (2017)

regulated entities. Rather than viewing them as passive victims,
the warfare-as-regulation paradigm is interested in their
incentives and how they will respond to being “regulated.”227 In
doing so, the warfare-as-regulation paradigm humanizes military
targets and their communities. And the paradigm expands
analysis beyond the narrow question of whether the targets
qualify as “combatants” to the broader context—the effects
regulation has on the communities where national security
activities occur and the implications for long-term U.S. interests.
IV. Targeted Killing as Regulation
This section introduces a model of the U.S. government’s
national security activities as regulation, using the targeted
killing process as a case study. The purpose of this model is to
identify the key participants in the regulatory process, map their
relative degrees of influence and incentives, and hypothesize how
these variables affect the regulatory process.
This model is limited to the targeted killing process. Each
category of the U.S. government’s national security endeavors—
other exercises of military force and intelligence gathering,
progressive counterinsurgency, border control, military detention,
interrogation, the prosecution of war crimes, and covert action—
constitutes a different form of regulation with its own set of
institutional players, power dynamics, and incentives.228
Modeling these other regulatory processes is a project for another
day. However, given the common identity of the players and their
oft-aligned incentives, I expect that the conclusions I draw about
targeted killing as regulation will apply, to a greater or lesser
extent, to most other national security activities.
This model will strike many as too simple because it relies on
a handful of assumptions from the economic branch of public
choice theory, all of which have been subjected to formidable
227. See infra Part III.C (identifying innocent communities inadvertently
affected by drone strikes as akin to a regulated entity because they have almost
no power compared to the other key players).
228. Cf. Barkow, supra note 45, at 717–18 (noting the various ways in which
the criminal justice system regulates).
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criticism.229 It assumes, for starters, that all of the players in the
process are rational actors.230 I do not discuss, for example, how
behavioral biases may affect the players’ decisions.231
I begin with this model for several reasons. First, in charting
new territory, it is best to start with a simple model, test its
predictive value, then move on to more sophisticated models as
necessary.232 Second, the assumptions I rely on are quite popular
in the legal scholarship analyzing agency functions;233 they form
the basis for many legal and institutional reform proposals,
which it is important to engage with.234 Finally, for reasons I
discuss below, some unusual features of the national security
bureaucracy actually lend themselves better to a simple economic
public choice model than bureaucracies performing other
regulatory functions.235

229. Cf. Mashaw, supra note 65, at 20 (“[T]he crucial unifying thread in
public choice theory is the assumption that all actors in political life . . . behave
rationally to maximize or optimize some objective function (wealth, status,
power).”).
230. See id. at 33 (critique public choice theory with the observation that
voters are often irrational).
231. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Jonathan Renshon, Hawkish Biases, in
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE POLITICS OF FEAR: THREAT INFLATION SINCE
9/11 79 (A. Trevor Thrall & Jane K. Cramer eds., 2009); see Lieutenant
Commander Luke A. Whittemore, Proportionality Decision Making in Targeting:
Heuristics, Cognitive Biases, and the Law, 7 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 577, 614 (2016)
(applying Kahneman’s literature to the targeted killing context).
232. See Mashaw, Public Law and Public Choice, supra note at 65, at 23
(describing the early research in public choice theory and how it influences
today’s scholarship).
233. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 45, at 717–20 (comparing regulation of
traditional industries to criminal justice); Sales, supra note 70, at 323–32
(recounting national security agencies’ historical failures in sharing
counterterrorist intelligence data).
234. See, e.g., Sales, supra note 70, at 348–51 (encouraging reform of
national security agencies’ intelligence gathering related to counter terrorism);
Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration, supra note 36, at 335 (proposing that
some DOJ functions be moved to an executive agency to “add a layer of
protection from prosecutorial pressure”).
235. See infra Part III.B (introducing an analysis of power dynamics in
national security using public choice theory).
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A. The Targeted Killing Process

Targeted killing is “the intentional, premeditated, and
deliberate use of lethal force, by States or their agents acting
under color of law, or by an organized armed group in armed
conflict, against a specific individual who is not in the physical
custody of the perpetrator.”236 Drones are the vehicle of choice for
most targeted killing operations.237 Indeed, they have become
crucial to the exercise of U.S. air power: even manned aircraft are
likely to have drone accompaniment on targeting missions.238 By
2009, the Air Force was training more pilots to fly drones than
conventional aircraft.239
The U.S. government has been conducting two types of
targeted killing using drones aimed at members of armed groups
that, the U.S. government asserts, it is authorized to use force
against under U.S. and international law.240 The first type are
236. See Alston, supra note 22, at 298 (noting that the use of drone strikes
outside war zones has been criticized as unlawful “extrajudicial killings” and
“assassinations”); Mary Ellen O’Connell, To Kill or Capture Suspects in the
Global War on Terror, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 325, 331 (2003) (quoting critics
such as Amnesty International and the U.N. Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial killing). See generally SCAHILL, supra note 25 (analyzing
documents that reveal aspects of the American government’s assassination
program using drones).
237. See Jaffer, supra note 2, at 9 (“Very quickly the armed drone—touted as
distant, efficient, and precise—became identified with [Obama] . . . .”).
238. See, e.g., Barbara Starr, Obama Last Strike Kills Over 100 al Qaeda in
Syria,
CNNPOLITICS
(Jan.
20,
2017,
6:25
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/20/politics/us-strike-syria-al-qaeda/index.html (last
visited Nov. 12, 2017) (describing a strike against “core al Qaeda” in western
Syria carried out by a B-52 bomber accompanied by drones) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
239. See SCAHILL, supra note 25, at 103 (quoting a top-secret NSA document
stating that, “‘for the first time in the history of the U.S. Air Force, more pilots
were trained to fly drones . . . than conventional fighter aircraft’”).
240. For a small sample of the extensive literature on the legal authority for,
and limitations on, drone warfare, see U.N. General Assembly, Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Addendum: Rep. of the Special Rapporteur,
¶ 18–22 U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010); NILS MELZER, TARGETED
KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 447–504 (2008); Kenneth Anderson, Targeted
Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law, in LEGISLATING THE WAR ON
TERROR: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM 346–400 (Benjamin Wittes ed., 2009); Robert
Chesney, Who May Be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the
International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, in YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
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“personality strikes” at identified individuals who, after a
multi-agency intelligence-gathering and deliberation process, are
determined to be members of the groups and meet other
criteria.241 “Signature strikes,” in contrast, target individuals
whose identities may or may not be known at the time they are
targeted, but who exhibit a pattern of behavior that, the
government believes, indicates they are members of the groups.242
Both types of strikes take place after considerable
intelligence gathering and assessment, as well as the application
of rules under predetermined procedures.243 The government has
revealed far more information about the procedures leading to
personality strikes, and the bureaucracy involved is presumably
more robust. Each personality strike results from two
adjudicatory proceedings—the first ends with the decision to
place a potential target on the “kill list,” and the second ends
with the strike decision.244
The two types of strikes occur as part of a single drone
program, conducted (often jointly) by the CIA and the DOD with
the assistance of numerous intelligence-gathering agencies.245
HUMANITARIAN LAW 13–27 (2010).
241. See generally Drone Playbook, supra note 25 (prescribing rules for the
nomination and approval of targets for personality strikes and conducting
signature strikes); McNeal, supra note 25, at 701–58 (describing the process in
more detail, based on interviews with participants).
242. See generally Craig, supra note 209, at 2368; Marty Lederman, The
Presidential Policy Guidance for Targeting and Capture Outside Afghanistan,
Iraq
and
Syria,
JUST
SECURITY
(Aug.
6,
2016,
2:40
PM),
https://www.justsecurity.org/32298/presidential-policy-guidance-targetingcapture-afghanistan-iraq-syria/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2017) (observing from
analysis of the Drone Playbook that signature strikes are conducted against
both known and unknown individuals) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
243. See generally Drone Playbook, supra note 25 (outlining general
operating procedures for when and how the United States can use force against
terrorists); McNeal, supra note 25, at 701–58.
244. See McNeal, supra note 25, at 701–58. (explaining how targeting
killings are conducted). I discuss the interagency approval process for
personality strikes in more detail in Part V.A.
245. See Adam Entous & Gordon Lubold, Obama’s Drone Revamp Gives
Military Bigger Responsibility, Keeps CIA Role, WALL ST. J. (June 16, 2016, 5:04
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/barack-obamas-long-awaited-drone-programrevamp-preserves-a-cia-role-1466088122 (last visited Nov. 12, 2017) (discussing
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Private contractors play a critical and influential role in the
process—from collecting intelligence, to analyzing it, to the
remote piloting of drones.246 The drones themselves are expensive
and built by companies with decades of experience selling
weaponry and other equipment to the U.S. government.247 The
government measures the success of the drone program primarily
by the number of those killed who can be identified as armed
group members.248
B. The Key Players
Economic public choice models of U.S. government regulatory
activities typically include the following players—the regulating
agencies; the regulated entities; the President; the Congress; the
courts; and the American public. Often models will also include
public interest organizations and any other institutions
interested in the products of the regulatory process.249 In the
targeted killing process, the model should include the private
firms who help staff the program’s operation and those who
the shift in control over drone programs to the U.S. military) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
246. See COCKBURN, supra note 27, at 48–50 (describing examples of specific
services private contractors provide and the ways in which these contractors
interact with and influence military officials); Michael S. Schmidt, Air Force,
Running Low on Drone Pilots, Turns to Contractors in Terror Fight, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept.
5,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/06/us/air-force-dronesterrorism-isis.html?mcubz=1&_r=0 (last visited Nov. 12, 2017) (discussing the
recent increase in the United States’ use of private contractors for drone
attacks) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
247. See COCKBURN, supra note 27, at 51–72 (discussing the historical role
equipment companies have had in U.S. military conflicts).
248. See id. at 68–72 (describing the testing accuracy of drones and the
drones’ efficiency in locating Osama bin Laden); SCAHILL, supra note 25, at 10–
12. The government also assesses the effect of strikes on enemy activities and
the long-term effects on U.S. foreign policy. See Drone Playbook, supra note 25,
§ 1.G (“When considering a proposed operational plan, Principals and Deputies
shall evaluate . . . [t]he implications for the broader regional and international
political interests of the United States . . . .”).
249. See Farber & O’Connell, supra note 23, at 5–6 (discussing the
broadening of recent public choice models); Mashaw, Public Law and Public
Choice, supra note 65, at 19–20 (describing the various lenses through which
public choice theory can be viewed).
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provide the necessary equipment. It should also include the small
number of U.S. public interest organizations that pay close
attention to, and are generally critical of, the drone program.250
In addition, extraterritorial regulatory activities, such as
targeted killing, involve a “two-level game,” in which U.S.
institutions must be responsive to both domestic and
international politics.251 So a model for targeted killing as
regulation must also include foreign nations, their citizens, and
international organizations with an interest in the targeted
killing process.252
C. The Power Dynamics
The most notable aspect of the power dynamics in the
targeted killing process is the dominance of the agencies—
especially the DOD and the CIA, which have been engaged in a
power struggle for years over control of the program.253 Agency
dominance in a national security regulatory process is neither
unusual nor surprising. Secrecy and the complex, yet close-knit,
structure of the bureaucracy give agencies vast coordination and
information advantages which make congressional oversight

250. The most influential U.S. organization has probably been the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). See The Lawfare Podcast: Jameel Jaffer on the
“The
Drone
Memos”,
LAWFARE
(Jan.
14,
2017,
1:30
PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-jameel-jaffer-drone-memos
(last
visited Nov. 12, 2017) (discussing the ACLU’s efforts to hold the U.S.
government accountable for its targeted killing practices) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
251. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of
Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427, 434 (1988) (discussing the political
complexities of international negotiations world players face in balancing
domestic and international interests).
252. See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Administrative War, 82 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1343, 1363 (2014) (“[O]ne may presume that the United States, like many
other nation-states, responds to external pressures from the international
system as well as domestic institutions, interests, and public priorities.”).
253. See generally Entous & Lubold, supra note 245 (describing President
Obama’s active role in attempting to settle a “three-year turf battle” between
the CIA, the DOD, and Congress over the CIA’s role in drone campaigns
following the September 11, 2001 attacks).
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extremely difficult.254 Accordingly, Congress has conducted very
little oversight of the drone program.255 For similar reasons, the
American public has even less capacity to assess, or even know
about, regulation in the national security realm than the
members of Congress who represent them.256 Elections rarely
hinge on national security issues. For these reasons, the public
also tends to be a weak institutional player.257
Even the President, who has far better access to secret
information and expert advice than members of Congress, has a
limited ability to influence the trajectory of national security
policies that are already in place.258 The President appoints only
254. See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 17–18 (observing that national security
bureaucrats “face no need for hearings or markups or floor debates”); ZEGART,
supra note 63, at 27 (noting the distinction between the secrecy of national
security agency activity and the relative openness of domestic policy agency
activity); Damien Van Puyvelde, Intelligence Accountability and the Role of
Public Interest Groups in the United States, 28 INTELLIGENCE & NAT’L SECURITY
139, 147 (2013) (“[I]ncreased secrecy has impacted upon the legislative and
judiciary branches’ ability to oversee and review intelligence activities.”).
255. One exception was President Obama’s nomination of John Brennan as
CIA Director. Protests interrupted the hearings, and Brennan was questioned
by senators about the targeted killing process. See McNeal, supra note 25, at
777 (discussing Brennan’s confirmation hearings and how Senators used the
nomination to hold President Obama politically accountable); Mary Ellen
O’Connell, The Questions Brennan Can’t Dodge, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/07/opinion/the-questions-brennan-cantdodge.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2017) (arguing that Senators should “hold Mr.
Brennan to account for one of the administration’s gravest failings: its refusal to
openly discuss the legal basis for America’s campaign of targeted killings of
terrorism suspects”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
256. See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 16–17 (discussing the expansive yet
tight-knit nature of the U.S. national security culture); McNeal, supra note 25,
at 789 (“There are few incentives for elected officials to exercise greater
oversight over targeted killings, and interest group advocacy is not as strong in
matters of national security and foreign affairs as it is in domestic politics.”).
257. See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 8–9 (discussing the public’s general lack
of focus on national security issues); McNeal, supra note 25, at 775 (noting that
congressional political incentives generally favor support for targeted killing);
ZEGART, supra note 63, at 26 (“[T]he relatively weak interest group environment
substantially reduces Congress’s interest and role in creating new national
security agencies. With interest groups largely out of the picture, the average
member has little incentive to expend significant time and political capital in
designing foreign policy agencies.”).
258. See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 58–59 (discussing the President’s
weaknesses in forging national security policy); Theodore Sorensen, You Get to
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several hundred civilian officials to oversee a national security
bureaucracy that, with contractors included, employs millions.259
When NSC members are united on a particular policy—which
they usually are—it is especially difficult for the President to say
“no.”260 In 2009, four members of the NSC—the Secretary of
Defense, Director of National Intelligence (DNI), CIA Director,
and National Security Advisor—formed a united front to
persuade President Obama to continue and expand the drone
program begun under President Bush. Crucially, at the same
time, they leveraged their control over information to “curtail
discussion of the policy’s broader ramifications.”261 Although the
President exercises direct supervisory authority over the
program, and is involved in many of the ultimate decisions to
conduct a strike, he must rely on the intelligence provided by the
bureaucracy and the advice of the officials who lead it.
Private firms, on the other hand, are so intimately involved
in nearly every stage of the targeted killing process that their
ability to influence regulatory policy is quite strong.262 The
success of the program depends on the performance of their
personnel and equipment.263 And a robust revolving door between
the private and public sectors in this area contributes to the
private firms’ power.264 Note that this is not a case of regulatory
Walk to Work, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 19, 1967) (“Presidents rarely, if ever,
make decisions—particularly in foreign affairs—in the sense of writing their
conclusions on a clean slate . . . . [T]he basic decisions, which confine their
choices, have all too often been previously made.”).
259. GLENNON, supra note 5, at 16.
260. See id. at 62–64 (noting that the “president must choose his battles
carefully . . . he has limited political capital and must spend it
judiciously . . . . Under the best of circumstances, he can only attack . . . policies
one by one, in flanking actions, and even then with no certainty of victory”).
261. See id. at 61 (discussing VALI NASR, THE DISPENSABLE NATION:
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN RETREAT 180 (2013)).
262. DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE, supra note 27, at 40–44.
263. See id. at 32–33 (discussing the drawbacks of the DOD cutting
personnel and equipment).
264. See id. at 123 (discussing “the revolving door for government
contracting officials and senior management and board members at contracting
firms” and the ways in which congressional oversight fails to curb corruption).
Because the interests of private contractors and the military are so closely
aligned, it may be that contractors rarely actually influence policy. See Scott M.
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capture in the now commonly understood sense—a scenario in
which the regulated entities control the regulating agency.265
Private firms here are more regulators than regulated.
In fact, the targeting regulatory process harkens back to a
different capture scenario—pro-regulatory capture by entities
who are not themselves regulated, but stand to benefit, and in
which the regulated entities have comparatively little influence
in the process.266 An enormous asymmetry exists between the
U.S. national security bureaucracy that regulates through
targeted killing and the entities who are most directly
regulated—(1) the targets themselves and (2) civilians who are
mistakenly killed or whose lives and property are affected by the
strikes. By the traditional measures, these individuals have
almost zero influence in the regulatory process. As regulated
entities, they most closely resemble those arrested or convicted of
crimes,267 but their power position is even worse.268 Those affected
by drone strikes live in remote areas where territory is often
contested and governance is weak. Unlike most arrestees or
convicts in the U.S. criminal justice system, they are, with rare
exceptions, not citizens of the nation that is regulating them.269
Sullivan, Private Force/Public Goods, 42 CONN. L. REV. 853, 856 (2010) (arguing
that private military companies’ values and characteristics reflect a penchant
for legal and regulatory compliance). But this could be changing as contractors
seek to expand into nonmilitary markets. See infra Part IV.C (discussing the
political pressures national security bureaucrats face concerning regulations).
265. See Nicholas Bagley, Agency Hygiene, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 1, 2
(2010) (defining capture as a “shorthand for the phenomenon whereby regulated
entities wield their superior organizational capacities to secure favorable agency
outcomes at the expense of the diffuse public”); Livermore & Revesz, supra note
165, at 1340 (listing sources and their definitions of regulatory capture).
266. See infra notes 301–304 and accompanying text (discussing the
antiregulatory orientation of the public choice field).
267. See Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note 45, at 726 (“[I]ndividuals
who have been convicted of a crime are not a powerful interest group. The
families and communities of these offenders may oppose the harsh sentencing
laws, but they currently lack the political pull to present strong opposition.”).
268. See McNeal, supra note 25, at 775 (observing that “[t]here is no large
[domestic] constituency that is impacted by the targeted killing program”).
269. See Grant & Keohane, supra note 1032, at 40 (noting that “[e]ven
democratic states will act in a biased way toward noncitizens” and that domestic
“mechanisms of accountability . . . can work against the interests of noncitizens
affected by government policies”). In the extremely rare instance when a U.S.
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Nor are they citizens of major global powers like China, or close
U.S. allies, which could conceivably wield real influence in the
regulatory process on their behalf.270 Even their own
governments, for reasons of internal and global power politics,
are usually unwilling or unable to advocate for them.271
The only significant way the regulated entities may influence
the targeting process relates to counterinsurgency strategy and
blowback. Under a pure capture-kill approach, drone strikes that
kill innocent civilians are simply imposing collateral damage.
That collateral damage may exceed legal norms or be ethically
abhorrent. But under a public choice model, these aspects alone
have little potential to affect the targeting regulatory process. In
contrast, if drone strikes are conducted as part of a progressive
counterinsurgency strategy, where winning the population is the
key to victory, those most affected by the targeting process can
wield influence by shifting their support to the insurgency.272 If
targeted killing as a tactic makes it more difficult to reach the
strategic goal, policymakers may be persuaded to limit its use—in
other words, to regulate less.

citizen is targeted, the Drone Playbook requires that the President personally
approve the strike decision. See Drone Playbook, supra note 25, §§ 19, 3.E.2.
(discussing the presidential review procedures for drone strikes).
270. See Ashley Deeks, Checks and Balances from Abroad, 83 U. CHI. L. REV.
65, 67 (2016) (discussing the wide range of foreign actors who may influence
domestic policy). The nations where strikes occur, or from which attacks are
launched, may exercise meaningful negotiation constraints on U.S. drone policy
if they choose. See Grant & Keohane, supra note 1032, at 37 (recognizing the
potential of negotiation constraints as a limit on the global abuse of power);
McNeal, supra note 25, at 779 (noting similar limits). But for the most part,
they have not chosen to do so. In addition, the handful of targets who are
citizens of allied nations tend to be outlaws, who could be punished under the
criminal justice systems of their home nations or the United States if they could
be arrested.
271. See Grant & Keohane, supra note 1032, at 40 (observing that
“[a]ccountability in world politics is inextricably entangled with power
relationships” and that “[w]eak actors—including small, poor countries in the
Global South and, more, their often disenfranchised publics—–lack the capacity
systematically to hold powerful actors accountable”).
272. See supra notes 154–163 and accompanying text (discussing the
“kill-capture” method as a form of regulation).
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As for the courts, they have demonstrated the potential to
influence agencies’ national security regulating.273 By recognizing
the due process rights of military detainees274 and constitutional
habeas jurisdiction at Guantanamo Bay,275 the Supreme Court
essentially forced agencies to create a combatant status review
process276 and discouraged the use of the naval base as an
offshore detention-interrogation center.277 The procedural
difficulties this created for detention programs pressured
policymakers to shift to a targeted killing strategy instead.278 And
it was a successful Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit
that forced the Obama Administration to release the Drone
Playbook.279 However, despite a nascent shift toward increased
judicial scrutiny of national security activities in recent years,280
the courts are affecting most policies only at the margins, if at all.
Their interventions are far too infrequent and timid.281 The

273. Compare McNeal, supra note 25, at 760 (observing that, “when
triggered, legal accountability [through judicial review] imposes a high degree of
externally based control over the targeted killing process”), with Craig, supra
note 209, at 2364–65 (arguing that judicial review may reduce accountability by
endowing the targeting process with “false legitimation”).
274. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (discussing the due
process rights of a U.S. citizen being held as an enemy combatant).
275. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2275 (2008) (recognizing
habeas rights for detainees being held as enemy combatants at Guantanamo).
276. See supra notes 185–191 and accompanying text (discussing the ways
in which the Court’s refusal to defer to the Executive branch in the Guantanamo
cases altered national security policy).
277. See Chesney, Who May Be Held?, supra note 191, at 804 (discussing the
relative ineffectiveness of offshore interrogation techniques for intelligence
gathering).
278. See id. (noting the recent increase in lethal drone strikes).
279. See Charlie Savage, U.S. Releases Rules for Airstrike Killings of Terror
Suspects,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
6,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/07/us/politics/us-releases-rules-for-airstrikekillings-of-terror-suspects.html?mcubz=1 (last visited Nov. 12, 2017) (discussing
the declassification of the “drone strike playbook” and the drone program’s
increased legitimacy as a result of the playbook’s release) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
280. See supra Part III.A.3 (describing the ways in which several Supreme
Court decisions have increased scrutiny of the national security state’s
activities).
281. See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Drones Versus Their Critics: A Victory for
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courts have declined to review the merits of drone strikes, either
the substantive standards or procedures.
The remaining institutional players are (1) United States
and international public interest organizations with strong views
about the targeted killing process and (2) foreign governments,
who may see the process as affecting their national interests.282
There is some evidence that relentless pressure by anti-targeting
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) caused the President
and the agencies to rethink the targeted killing regulatory
process—at least in the sense of introducing some
transparency.283 In 2016, under pressure from NGOs, the Obama
Administration finally released the official death toll—civilian
and combatant—from drone strikes for the period of 2009–
2016.284 As with public interest groups that advocate for criminal
justice reform, however, these NGOs face a steep uphill climb,
and the progress they have made has been agonizingly slow in
coming.285
President Obama’s War Powers Legacy?, SMALL WARS J. (Oct. 14, 2015, 11:09
PM), http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/drones-versus-their-critics-a-victoryfor-president-obama’s-war-powers-legacy (last visited Nov. 12, 2017) (noting
U.S. courts’ general unwillingness to intervene in the targeted killing process)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). But see Craig, supra note
209, at 2364–65 (noting that, when the Supreme Court has intervened in
detention cases, it has resulted in an increase in public acceptance of the
military detention system).
282. See Deeks, supra note 270, at 66–67 (observing that “a variety of
foreign actors—including leaders, courts, citizens, and corporations—have the
capacity to affect either the quantum of power within a single branch or the
allocation of power among the three branches of the U.S. government,
particularly in the area of intelligence activity”).
283. In public statements, President Obama was ambiguous about the
influence of these organizations. See Jonathan Chait, Five Days That Shaped a
Presidency,
N.Y.
MAG.
(Oct.
2,
2016,
9:00
PM),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/10/barack-obama-on-5-days-thatshaped-his-presidency.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2017) (observing that, while
“the critique of drones has been important,” internal reforms were prompted by
the “routineness” of agency attitudes toward targeted killing and the increase in
drone strikes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
284. See Jaffer, supra note 2, at 13 (noting that, “over the seven-year period
ending on December 31, 2015, ‘counterterrorism strikes outside the areas of
active hostilities’ had killed between 64 and 116 noncombatants”).
285. See Dalal, supra note 99, at 105 (describing the imbalance between the
lobbying power of “underrepresented and underfunded activist groups” and the
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Most foreign governments have, so far, demonstrated little
interest in influencing the targeting process. Many have, in fact,
tacitly supported it by providing much of the intelligence used to
select and locate targets.286 This includes U.S. allies and other
nations who may face domestic terrorist attacks from the armed
groups, and who therefore may see the United States as
providing a global public good.287
For obvious reasons, the governments of the nations where
strikes occur have a more complex relationship with the process.
They have a strong interest in the outcome of warfare conducted
on their territory, and they theoretically have the power to make
it difficult for the United States to carry out strikes: they could
deny consent or publicly denounce the operations.288 So far,
however, they have played a double game—often condemning, yet
tolerating, or even assisting, targeting operations—because they
face conflicting incentives.289 They are themselves conducting
counterinsurgency operations against the same armed groups the
United States is targeting, but perceived cooperation with the
“powerful defense contractor lobby and the national security war hawks”);
Dunlap, supra note 281 (noting that, despite “robust criticism by significant
parts of the legal, academic, and political communities, neither the courts nor
Congress have evinced much inclination to curtail or even publically scrutinize
the Administration’s use of drones”).
286. See COCKBURN, supra note 27, at 230–34 (discussing Pakistan’s role in
providing intelligence for, and taking credit for, certain drone strikes).
287. See Robert Knowles, A Realist Defense of the Alien Tort Statute, 88
WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1167 (2011) (positing that “the United States provides a
public good through its efforts to combat terrorism”).
288. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Constitution Follows the Drone: Targeted
Killings, Legal Constraints, and Judicial Safeguards, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 21, 29 (2015) (noting that “publically available information suggests that
states [where strikes occur] have granted their consent, though at least
Pakistani officials have recently made statements to the contrary”); McNeal,
supra note 25, at 779–80 (noting that allies such as Pakistan and nations whose
territory is used for military operations may, if they choose, exert pressure on
the United States to alter targeting policy).
289. See, e.g., INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS & CONFLICT RESOLUTION CLINIC
(STANFORD LAW SCH.) GLOB. JUSTICE CLINIC (N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW), LIVING
UNDER DRONES: DEATH, INJURY, AND TRAUMA TO CIVILIANS FROM U.S. DRONE
PRACTICES IN PAKISTAN 15–17 (2012) [hereinafter INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS &
CONFLICT RESOLUTION CLINIC] (discussing Pakistan’s divided role with respect to
drone use in its northwestern territory).
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United States may be politically poisonous, even among the
population that does not support the insurgency.290
As with the targets and victims of the strikes, the ability of
NGOs and foreign governments to influence the targeting process
depends on whether it is being used as part of, or in conjunction
with, a progressive counterinsurgency strategy. Successful
progressive
counterinsurgency
hinges
on
establishing
legitimacy.291 If these institutional players regard drone strikes
as illegitimate and are able and willing to advocate for that view
with the relevant population, they could have a more substantial
influence on the targeting process.
Through 2016, however, that process has clearly been
dominated by the agencies and private firms who carry out the
program, with the direct involvement of the President himself,
who, under current rules, must approve many personality
strikes.292 The remaining institutional players are quite weak,
especially compared to their power positions in the domestic
regulatory context.293
D. The Key Players’ Incentives
1. The Regulating Agencies and Private Firms
Because the agencies and private firms who conduct
targeting operations also dominate the process of targeting as
regulation, their incentives are the most important determinants
of the direction that regulation is likely to take.

290. See COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 157, at 1–9 (“[I]f a
population does not see outside forces as legitimate, this can undermine the
legitimacy of the host-nation government trying to counter an insurgency.”).
291. See supra notes 154–163 and accompanying text (discussing the
“kill-capture” method as a form of regulation).
292. See infra Part IV.A (discussing institutional reform as a possible
method for altering national security bureaucrats’ current bent towards
overregulation).
293. See ZEGART, supra note 63, at 21–28 (discussing the stark differences
between domestic policy and national security agencies and the ways these
differences weaken the influence of outside players).
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This is where economic public choice theory is most useful. It
is an influential view of regulation that developed in the 1960s
and 1970s as a challenge to the then-prevailing assumption that
agencies regulate in the public interest.294 Many core insights of
public choice theory concern bureaucrats’ incentives. William
Niskanen, in an influential 1971 study, proposed that
bureaucrats seek to maximize their own utility by increasing
their agencies’ budgets.295 Flowing from increased budgets were
increases in “salary, perquisites of the office, public reputation,
power, patronage, [and the] output of the bureau.”296 Other
theorists offered variations of Niskanen’s portrait of the rational
bureaucrat.297 Some proposed that bureaucrats are also
motivated by a zeal for the agency’s mission.298 Some seized on
Justice Stephen Breyer’s observation that bureaucrats engaged in
risk management tend to overregulate concerning rare,
high-profile risks.299 But the common thread was that
bureaucrats’ incentives drove them to overregulate.300
294. See Farber & O’Connell, supra note 23, at 2–8 (tracing the development
of economic public choice theory from its inception to present day).
295. See NISKANEN, supra note 66, at 39 (“It is impossible for any one
bureaucrat to act in the public interest, because of the limits on his information
and the conflicting interests of others, regardless of his personal motives.”);
Benjamin H. Barton, Harry Potter and the Half-Crazed Bureaucracy, 104 MICH.
L. REV. 1523, 1525 (2006) (observing that popular fantasy author J.K. Rowling,
in Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince, “depict[s] a Ministry of Magic run by
self-interested bureaucrats bent on increasing and protecting their power, often
to the detriment of the public at large”); see also William A. Niskanen,
Nonmarket Decision Making: The Peculiar Economics of Bureaucracy, 58 AM.
ECON. REV. 293, 293–94 (1968) (discussing how bureaucrats maximize utility).
The figure of the empire-building bureaucrat has had lasting influence in the
public imagination as well.
296. NISKANEN, supra note 66, at 38.
297. See Farber & O’Connell, supra note 23, at 4–5 (describing the modern
expansion of Niskanen’s model to include a broader range of players and
structures).
298. See DeMuth & Ginsburg, White House Review, supra note 26, at 1081–
82 (noting the challenge in using traditional social cost and benefit analyses
given agencies’ tendency to favor their own mission).
299. See BREYER, supra note 24, at 9–10; (describing the risk assessment
process and the potential for different risks to arise due to regulations);
Christopher DeMuth, Can the Administrative State Be Tamed?, 8 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 121, 142–43 (2016).
300. Although Niskanen focused on the inefficiency produced by
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Indeed, although many public choice theorists simply
advocated for better or more efficient regulation, the field
generally had an antiregulatory bent.301 Murray Weidenbaum, an
influential member of Ronald Reagan’s 1980 campaign team,
flipped conventional wisdom on its head, arguing that business
firms actually represented the general public interest (as proxies
for consumers) and that environmentalists were a “special
interest group.”302 In fact, one popular version of capture theory
during the 1970s and 1980s was not the now-familiar one about
regulated private firms manipulating regulating bureaucrats to
their advantage:303 instead, it told the story of public interest
groups working hand-in-hand with zealous, prestige-seeking
agency bureaucrats to overregulate the hapless private sector at
the public’s expense.304

bureaucratic incentives, this became conflated, in the minds of reformers, with
the assumption that these bureaucrats were, at the same time, overregulating.
See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the
Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1263 (2006) (criticizing agency
regulation and calling for a reform of the Office of Management and Budget’s
review).
301. See id. at 1261–62 (“OMB’s advocates were frank that its primary
function was to create a ‘rebuttable presumption against regulation’ in order to
curb agencies’ supposed instincts to overregulate.”).
302. RICHARD REVESZ & MICHAEL LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY 22–23,
163–64 (2009).
303. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 300, at 1284 (“In [capture theory’s]
classic form . . . [i]n order to secure favorable regulations, the interest
group . . . will aggressively lobby committee members and provide support,
financial or otherwise, for the members’ reelection efforts. Those committee
members will then pressure the agencies to enact favorable regulations.”).
304. See id. at 1264–65 (discussing Reagan’s supporters’ promotion of
centralized review of agency decision-making in order to promote a “coordinated
and cost-effective regulatory state” and to curb excessive regulation); DeMuth &
Ginsburg, White House Review, supra note 26, at 1081–82 (arguing that
rule-makers should be held accountable to the President for costs and benefits of
their rules because this would “force regulators to confront problems of covert
redistribution and overzealous pursuit of agency goals, which experience has
shown to be common in regulatory programs”); Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2279 (2001) (“Proponents of [Reagan’s
executive review process] stressed the need . . . to guard against regulatory
failures—in particular, excessive regulatory costs imposed by single-mission
agencies with ties to special interest groups and congressional committees.”).
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These conservative anti-regulatory public choice theorists
had domestic market and quality-of-life regulation in mind when
they developed their critiques.305 As it turned out, many of their
approaches fell apart under scrutiny or had poor success at
predicting actual agency behavior in those areas.306 For example,
due to collective action problems, public interest groups seeking
benefits for the general public are frequently outgunned by
narrow business interests when influencing agency regulation.307
And those business interests are likely to favor less regulation.308
Moreover, as Daryl Levinson has argued, domestic agencies do
not always behave as empire-building, budget-maximizers—in
fact, they actively avoid regulating in some instances.309
However, there is plenty of evidence that regulation by
national security bureaucrats is different—that the 1970s fable of
the empire-building, overregulating bureaucrat urged on by a
small group of pro-regulatory private firms is, in the unique
national security context, accurate. First, analysts of the national
security state, some of whom served in it, describe its bureaucrats
as motivated, even obsessed with, expanding their agencies’
budgets, authority, autonomy, and prestige.310 These bureaucrats
305. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 300, at 1289 (criticizing agencies for
failing to prioritize health and safety in rulemaking).
306. See id. at 1287–300 (discussing studies and analyses that call into
question fundamental tenets of public choice theory relating to domestic
regulation).
307. See id. at 1288–89 (noting that “if any group has disproportionate
access to the administrative state, it is industry”). But see Christopher C.
DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Rationalism in Regulation, 108 MICH. L. REV.
877, 910 (2010) (arguing that this analysis “obscur[es] the inconvenient fact that
environmentalists and consumers . . . have managed to organize themselves into
highly effective lobbying groups”).
308. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 300, at 1282–304 (arguing that the
public choice assumptions about bureaucratic incentives often do not hold up
when the behavior of quality-of-life regulators is examined).
309. See Levinson, supra note 12, at 932–34 (discussing empire-building in
the context of non-elected government officials).
310. National security bureaucrats see these goals as interrelated. See
SCAHILL, supra note 25, at 51 (quoting a former CIA official’s observation that,
“[i]f you get the budget, then you control the decisions”); Sales, supra note 70, at
282 (arguing that “[i]ntelligence agencies seek to maximize their influence over
senior policymakers” and “autonomy—i.e., the ability to pursue agency priorities
without outside interference”).
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believe that the most effective way to do so in most situations is
to advocate for aggressive intelligence collection and the
muscular, “hard-hitting” military options.311 They are therefore
incentivized both to inflate threats and to conclude that their
agency’s particular weaponry and skill sets are the best tools for
meeting those threats.312 They gain bigger budgets, more
authority, and greater prestige when their weapons and
personnel are deployed.313
Second, national security bureaucrats are true believers in
their agencies’ missions, which today is counterterrorism.314
Attempts to introduce a secondary, rights-protecting mission into
such agencies by adding an office of civil liberties, for example,
typically fail as the rights-protecting bureaucrats are redirected
toward fulfilling the agency’s primary counterterrorism
mission.315

311. See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 19 (noting the government’s, and
particularly the President’s, fear of appearing “soft” or “weak” in military
policy); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND
POLITICS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 65–66 (1957) (describing “the military
mind” as “skeptical of institutional devices designed to prevent war,”
particularly including those of international law).
312. See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 19–22 (discussing threat inflation in
military policy); SCAHILL, supra note 25, at 51 (quoting a former CIA official’s
observation that “everybody thinks that whatever toys they control are the toys
that need to be used and therefore you need more of them”).
313. See infra notes 339–352 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for
the drone program’s prevalence).
314. See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 26–27 (noting the remarkable unanimity
among national security bureaucrats, especially at the upper levels).
315. See Shirin Sinnar, Institutionalizing Rights in the National Security
Executive, 50 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 289, 294–300 (2015)
(detailing the prevalence and function of internal rights oversight offices); see
also Alston, supra note 22, at 283 (concluding that, with respect to the drone
program, “[t]he CIA’s internal control mechanisms, including its Inspector
General, have had no discernible impact”); Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating
Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15,
21–24 (2010) (observing that, when an agency is assigned two conflicting
missions, one of the missions will usually swallow the other); J.R. DeShazo &
Jody Freeman, Public Agencies As Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2217, 2220
(2005) (“Agencies frequently resolve . . . interstatutory conflicts by prioritizing
their primary mission and letting their secondary obligations fall by the
wayside.”).
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Third, national security bureaucrats are incentivized to take
the approach to risk management that was believed to afflict
domestic regulators in the 1970s: they overregulate with respect
to high-profile, low probability risks.316 For national security
bureaucrats, the paradigmatic high-profile risk is the
mass-casualty terrorist attack.317 Unlike domestic bureaucrats at
agencies like the EPA or the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), however, the national security bureaucrat has greater
difficulty externalizing costs to the regulated entities. When the
EPA imposes emissions caps, it spends some money conducting
the rulemaking process, but most of the costs of regulating are
borne by the polluters.318 National security bureaucrats, in
contrast, need to spend much more money to regulate. They
spend billions on costly equipment and skilled personnel.
Moreover, when they regulate through the use of force, the costs
may include, not only the lives of noncombatant civilians, but also
the lives of service members and private contractors.319
The primary defense mechanism against the potential
prestige threat created by these costs is to hide them. Within the
national security bureaucracy, there are strong incentives to bury
or ignore policy failures—from continuing to pay for expensive
weapons that do not work320 to undercounting collateral deaths
316. See supra notes 299–300 and accompanying text (discussing the
bureaucratic tendency to overregulate in favor of an agency’s mission).
317. See BOBBITT, supra note 55, at 18 (discussing the United States’ fear of
terrorist attacks which has resulted in short-term action rather than long-term
strategic planning).
318. See Reitze, supra note 46, at 375–76. (noting that while some of the
financial burden of regulations is shifted to the consumer, market forces limit
the extent to which the burden can be shared). One large, catastrophic,
exception is climate change resulting from externalizing the costs of carbon
dioxide emissions.
319. See Linda J. Bilmes, The Financial Legacy of Iraq and Afghanistan:
How Wartime Spending Decisions Will Constrain Future National Security
Budgets 1 (Harvard Kennedy Sch., Working Paper RWP13-006, 2013),
https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.aspx?PubI
d=8956&type=WPN (calculating that “[t]he Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts,
taken together, will be the most expensive wars in U.S. history—totaling
somewhere between $4 to $6 trillion”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
320. See COCKBURN, supra note 27, at 168–88 (describing massive spending
on expensive and ineffective equipment for targeting operations).
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from the use of force321 to conducting missions “off the books.”322
Scaling back the level of regulation is rarely considered because it
is viewed as an admission of failure, which actually increases the
threat to bureaucratic prestige.323
Nonetheless, under some conditions, depending on the degree
of public attention to the costs of war activities, the national
security bureaucracy will face significant pressure to scale back
the level of regulation.324 Uses of force that result in the deaths of
service members are especially likely to become unpopular over
time.325
However, the rational national security bureaucracy, given
its incentives, will first respond to this type of threat to its
authority and prestige by shifting to a different type of
regulation—i.e., a different mode of warfare—if possible, rather
than scaling back the level of regulation.326 For example, in
response to increased scrutiny of military detention at
Guantanamo via habeas proceedings, transfers to Guantanamo
321. See infra notes 353–367 and accompanying text (discussing ways in
which agencies overregulate using drone strikes).
322. See Andrew de Grandpre & Shawn Snow, The U.S. Military’s Stats on
Deadly Airstrikes are Wrong. Thousands Have Gone Unreported, MIL. TIMES
(Feb.
5,
2017),
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/yourmilitary/2017/02/05/the-u-s-military-s-stats-on-deadly-airstrikes-are-wrongthousands-have-gone-unreported/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2017) (discussing the
“potentially thousands” of lethal airstrikes that the U.S. military has failed to
publically disclose) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
323. See Dalal, supra note 99, at 105 (“[C]hanging course implies that the
existing course is incorrect—an admission of failure that might expose the
agency to unwanted scrutiny and negatively implicate the agency’s top brass.”).
324. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing the ways in
which public opinion has contributed to the regulation of the national security
state).
325. See Gregory P. Noone, The War Powers Resolution and Public Opinion,
45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 145, 147–48 (2012) (observing that, “[n]o matter how
popular an exercise of American power may be at the beginning, support will
erode,” and that the “duration of the conflict and the number of casualties
directly impacts the level of support”).
326. See Chesney, Who May Be Held?, supra note 191, at 804 (observing
that, “like squeezing a balloon, . . . when one of these coercive powers becomes
constrained in new, more restrictive ways, the displaced pressure to
incapacitate may simply find expression through one of the alternative
mechanisms”).
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virtually stopped, and the use of targeted killing, and detention
was largely outsourced to foreign governments.327 Interagency
rivalry within the national security state also incentivizes
national security bureaucrats to find a different means of
regulating when the costs of one method become too apparent. If
one agency faces criticism for its regulating, another agency will
be happy to point out that its method of regulating is more
effective and efficient.328 And in general, the national security
bureaucrat is far more fearful about being blamed by the public
for a catastrophic failure than for spending too much money.329
This fear provides another incentive to inflate threats.330
Fourth, national security bureaucrats work side-by-side with
private contractors whose incentives are slightly different—they
center more on profit than prestige—but also point in the
direction of overregulation.331 Many of these firms have worked
with the national security bureaucracy for decades.332 Private
firms profit when the national security state uses their products
or services, of course. But the revolving door between public and
private333
means
that
contractors—Edward
Snowden
327. See id. (discussing the pressure the U.S. government has faced over
military detention and its impact on military strategy).
328. See ZEGART, supra note 63, at 38 (“[N]ational security agencies have
powerful incentives to worry about the design and operation of organizations
other than their own . . . . [B]ureaucratic interconnectedness guarantees that
changes to any one organization will affect others.”).
329. See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 19–20 (discussing the incentives for
national security bureaucrats to exaggerate existing threats and to create new
ones to protect themselves against public backlash in the event of an attack).
330. See id. (concluding that a rational actor in the national security
bureaucracy would inflate risks for this reason).
331. See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717,
748–49 (2010) (discussing contractors’ motivations to maximize remuneration
and prestige).
332. See COCKBURN, supra note 27, at 34–38 (describing one example of a
Canadian defense contractor appointed by President Carter who has exerted
significant influence on U.S. defense policy in the subsequent decades);
DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE, supra note 27, at 23 (discussing the
U.S. military’s increased use of private contractors in the decades since the
Vietnam War).
333. According to a 2007 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report,
fifty-two major defense contractors employed 86,181 of the 1,857,004 former
military and civilian personnel who had left DOD service since 2001, including
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notwithstanding—are likely to possess the national security
bureaucrats’ qualities—zeal for the counterterrorism mission,
prestige-seeking, tendency to inflate threats, and belief that
aggressive intelligence collection and use of force are the best
solutions.334 And even if the contractor does not share these
qualities with the bureaucrat, it is in her financial interest to act
as though she does.335 In addition, the revolving door provides an
“incentive[] [for regulators] to expand the market demand for
services they would be providing when they exit the
government.”336
In light of these incentives, it is clear why the drone program
became a centerpiece of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. In
theory, drones are an ideal weapon of war because they reduce
the costs of regulating.337 First, drones impose fewer direct costs
on the national security bureaucracy than other methods of
warfare.338 The drones themselves are now pricey pieces of

2,345 former DOD officials hired between 2004 and 2006. U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-485, DEFENSE CONTRACTING: POST-GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYMENT OF FORMER DOD OFFICIALS NEEDS GREATER TRANSPARENCY 4
(2008). See DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE, supra note 27, at 118–19
& n.100 (discussing the high numbers of former DOD employees who go to work
for military contractors, and observing that “many of the companies that won
contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan boasted top brass or former members of
Special Forces teams as corporate board members or senior executives”).
Dickinson points out that, because Congress repealed a statute requiring that
DOD report turnover numbers, the percentage of former DOD employees
working for national security contractors is likely much higher than the GAO
number. Id. at 119 n.100.
334. DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE, supra note 27, at 118–20.
335. See Michaels, supra note 331, at 748–49 (“Enticements of remuneration
or prestige may be enough to influence even apolitical contractors, leading them
to tell the agency chiefs what they want to hear. That is, the contractors’ advice
is colored by their desire to be ‘go-to’ contractors on other, or continuing,
programs.”).
336. Wentong Zheng, The Revolving Door, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265,
1269 (2015).
337. See Tung Yin, Game of Drones: Defending Against Drone Terrorism, 2
TEX. A&M L. REV. 635, 646–47 (2015) (comparing the cost advantage of drone
usage over that of a manned aircraft as well as the continued benefits of drone
usage as technology advances).
338. See id. at 639–40 (comparing the high cost of a typical fighter plane
with that of the much cheaper drone that serves virtually the same function).
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equipment,339 but their use dramatically lowers costs in many
important ways.340 No American service members’ lives are put at
immediate risk.341 No enemy territory need be occupied and
controlled.342 In other words, the death, property destruction, and
other harms that may result from drone strikes are externalized
to foreign citizens and communities.343 And in part because the
drone strikes occur in remote areas, intense media scrutiny and
high-profile backlash have been slow to gain traction.344
Moreover, drone strikes boost agency prestige by appearing,
at least, to reduce costs overall. When strong intelligence and the
right opportunity overlap, the drone operator may cleanly and
swiftly eliminate an enemy without the civilian deaths and
property damage other types of attacks typically cause.345 By
reducing such costs, the national security bureaucracy gains even
more prestige—it can credibly claim to be achieving crucial
military objectives while honoring the core principles of
international humanitarian law.346 Indeed, the glossary of the
339. The “backbone” of the drone fleet is the Reaper, which costs $30 million
per copy to produce, and each copy costs $5 million per year to maintain. See
COCKBURN, supra note 27, at 177. But they are being replaced by much more
expensive models. See id. at 253–55 (describing the newest generation of drones
that cost from $140 to $300 million per copy).
340. See Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret ‘Kill List’ Tests Obama’s Principles
and
Will,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
29,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-alqaeda.html?mcubz=1 (last visited Nov. 12, 2017) (listing the other costs
associated with drones) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
341. See Judah A. Druck, Droning on: The War Powers Resolution and the
Numbing Effect of Technology-Driven Warfare, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 209, 211
(2012) (“[L]ess is at stake when drones, not human lives, are on the front lines,
limiting the potential motivation of a legislator, judge, or antiwar activist to
check presidential action. As a result, the level of nonexecutive involvement in
foreign military affairs has decreased.”).
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. See, e.g., Radsan & Murphy, supra note 38, at 1203 (describing the
capabilities of drones to zero in on narrow targets from a significant distance).
346. See id. at 1204 (“Over time, a consensus will likely evolve that targeted
killing of suspected terrorists under some circumstances is legal under
[International Humanitarian Law].”); Becker & Shane, supra note 340 (quoting
former DNI Blair’s statement that the drone program was “the politically
advantageous thing to do—low cost, no U.S. casualties, gives the appearance of
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drone bureaucracy is filled with triumphalist terms like
“jackpot”—when
the
intended
target
is
killed—and
“touchdown”—when a target’s phone is neutralized after a drone
strike.347 And after the Bush Administration’s detention policies
caused massive legal and public relations problems,348 drone
technology enabled the shift away from capture to targeting.349
The program’s perceived effectiveness in killing members of
enemy armed forces helped restore morale at the CIA, which was
still suffering a crisis of confidence from past intelligence
disasters.350 In sum, with the drone program, the national
security bureaucrats’ agencies gained prestige, a morale boost
among its personnel, and a larger budget.351 Contractors who
supply the drones and the staff to pilot them got bigger
contracts.352
The problem, however, is that agencies with the incentive to
overregulate will, in fact, overregulate.353 In the targeted killing
context, the national security bureaucrat is incentivized to
overregulate because he maximizes his agency’s prestige by
producing enough targets and conducting enough strikes to
justify its budget and maintain the program’s primacy as a
counterterrorism tool.354 The demand for targets creates a
market, which the intelligence community and private
toughness, . . . plays well domestically, and . . . is unpopular only in other
countries”).
347. See Betsy Reed, Preface of JEREMY SCAHILL, THE ASSASSINATION
COMPLEX: INSIDE THE GOVERNMENT’S SECRET DRONE WARFARE PROGRAM ix (2016)
(referring to terms Scahill uncovered in his investigative drone research which
were then used in this book to illustrate U.S. drone tactics).
348. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (describing the litigation
challenging the legality of military detention at Guantanamo Bay).
349. See SCAHILL, supra note 25, at 5 (highlighting drones’ ability to aim at
targets from remote distances without need of support from ground forces).
350. See id. (referencing past intelligence failures like September 11).
351. See id. (describing a boost in morale).
352. COCKBURN, supra note 27, at 173.
353. See Jaffer, supra note 2, at 7 (“Eight years ago the targeted-killing
campaign required a legal and bureaucratic infrastructure, but now that
infrastructure will demand a targeted-killing campaign.”).
354. Id.; COCKBURN, supra note 27, at 223 (describing how officials loosened
targeting rules to increase the number of targets and therefore justify the
program’s budget).
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contractors in turn have an incentive to supply.355 This
overregulating bureaucracy has an incentive to nominate targets
or attack individuals based on insufficient intelligence;356 to use
drones to attack targets on the kill list when a personnel
operation would be more effective;357 to establish a low threshold
for conducting signature strikes;358 or to attack the target when
the risks of civilian casualties are likely to be disproportionate to
the military necessity.359 If the civilian death toll is in fact
disproportionate, or strikes fail to kill an intended target, the
bureaucracy has an incentive to counter this prestige threat by
labeling those killed as “enemies” and finding intelligence to
support such a determination if necessary.360 In general, the
entire bureaucracy is incentivized to keep its decisions as secret
as possible.361
355. See SCAHILL, supra note 25, at 104 (quoting a former anonymous
JSCOC drone operator’s observation that, “[b]ecause there is an ever-increasing
demand for more targets to be added to the kill list, the mentality is ‘[j]ust keep
feeding the beast’”).
356. See id. at 118 (discussing observations from high-level participants in
the drone program that SIGINT (signals intelligence), is “an inferior form of
intelligence [that], . . . account[s] for more than half the intelligence collected on
targets” and that there is an overreliance on less-reliable partner-nation
intelligence); COCKBURN, supra note 27, at 201–04 (discussing overreliance on
intelligence provided by rival armed groups seeking to weaken each other).
357. See id. at 114–18 (noting that targeted killing “short-circuits” the
“find-fix-finish-exploit-analyze” intelligence cycle because the dead target cannot
be exploited for intelligence).
358. See Becker & Shane, supra note 340 (reporting the State Department
officials’ “joke . . . that when the C.I.A. sees ‘three guys doing jumping jacks,’ the
agency thinks it is a terrorist training camp”).
359. See Guiora, supra note 204, at 242 (describing the burden of
distinguishing combatants from civilians and the necessity of making this
distinction prior to carrying out an attack).
360. See Becker & Shane, supra note 340 (reporting that the U.S.
government “counts all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants . . .
unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent”). See
generally SCAHILL, supra note 2527, at 47–48.
361. See Jack Serle, Obama Drone Casualty Numbers a Fraction of Those
Recorded by the Bureau, BUREAU INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (July 1, 2016),
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2016/07/01/obama-drone-casualtynumbers-fraction-recorded-bureau/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2017) (noting the
impetus to keep drone strike information secret because leaked government
records indicated the U.S. was sometimes unaware of the identities of people
they were killing, which would reflect negatively on drone operations) (on file
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And indeed, critics at NGOs, in academia, and elsewhere
have long contended that the drone program overregulates in
precisely these ways.362 In other words, it has many hidden
costs.363 Strikes typically kill far fewer enemies and far more
civilians than the government will admit;364 they inflict other
kinds of harm on the populations living in the areas where
strikes occur;365 and they have become recruiting tools for the
very armed groups they are attempting to disrupt.366 In more
general terms, its critics contend, the drone bureaucracy
systematically underestimates the long-term costs to America’s
interests when calculating the costs and benefits of adding a
name to the kill list or launching a strike.367
Although secrecy makes it difficult to assess the accuracy of
critics’ claims,368 they are more or less consistent with the
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
362. See id. (detailing the discrepancy between the number of casualties the
U.S. government reported and the much higher casualty numbers independent
entities documented).
363. See id. (suggesting that there are more costs to drone operations than
the public is aware of due to lack of government transparency).
364. See id. (describing how the U.S. is sometimes unaware of who they are
killing); see also Jaffer, supra note 2, at 16–18 (explaining how drones often
destroy innocent civilians in their private dwellings or even in open public
spaces).
365. See Jaffer, supra note 2, at 16–18 (depicting the incessant drone
attacks that destroyed homes, cars, and public spaces and the resulting trauma
experienced in the Pakistani communities). See generally INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS &
CONFLICT RESOLUTION CLINIC, supra note 289 (reporting the misleading
characteristics of the U.S. government narrative on drone usage and drone
strikes); COCKBURN, supra note 27, at 225–26 (noting that life in North
Waziristan, where drone attacks were frequent, had changed such that
weddings and funerals no longer took place because people were afraid to
gather); id. at 227 (describing frequent drone attacks as “devastat[ing] the life of
the society as comprehensively as if it had been subjected to a World War IIstyle carpet bombing”).
366. See Jaffer, supra note 2, at 15–16 (describing how drone attacks
increased anti-American sentiment in Pakistan and Yemen).
367. See, e.g., Becker & Shane, supra note 340 (quoting former United
States Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair’s statement that “any
damage” the drone program “does to the national interest only shows up over
the long term”); Jaffer, supra note 2, at 17–18.
368. See McNeal, supra note 25, at 756 (“[O]ne of the most obvious
challenges to the public debate over targeted killings is the lack of agreement
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above-described warfare-as-regulation model’s predictions.
Furthermore, unless the criticism can be successfully refuted, it
could put the national security bureaucrat, and the President
himself, in a bind.369 A drone program in which attacks routinely
fail to kill the enemy and which cause a disproportionate amount
of civilian casualties would seriously damage the prestige of the
agencies involved.370 At the same time, however, if the drone
bureaucracy scaled back substantially the number of strikes to
kill more actual enemies and fewer civilians, it would risk
relinquishing its status as the crown jewel of counterinsurgency
strategy.371 Either way, an entire bureaucracy invested in the
program’s dominance and success would suffer a devastating loss
of prestige and power.372 The Obama Administration’s response to
this prestige threat was to emphasize the substantive limits it
had imposed on drone strikes as a matter of policy and the
procedural aspects of the targeting process—its sheer complexity,
the numerous factors weighed in decision-making, and the
number and type of decision makers involved, including the
President himself.373 Leaks and the Drone Playbook revealed
that, over time, targeted killing procedures became quite
formalized and robust.374 The Administration emphasized that
about even the number of persons killed.”); Douglas Cox & Ramzi Kassem, Off
the Record: The National Security Council, Drone Killings, and Historical
Accountability, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 363, 364–65 (2014) (“Uncertainty over the
legal standards for the drone killing program and a lack of transparency
highlight the need for thorough documentation as a prerequisite for meaningful
oversight and accountability.”).
369. Cf. McNeal, supra note 25, at 777 (arguing that “successes and failures”
in targeting operations “are imputed directly to the President” because of his
personal involvement in the process).
370. Id. at 778.
371. See Glennon, supra note 5, at 26 (suggesting any decrease in drone
activity would risk the U.S. losing its foothold as a leader in drone counter
insurgency efforts).
372. Id.
373. See generally Drone Playbook, supra note 25 (outlining the various
roles governmental agencies and officers play in the drone decision-making
process).
374. See McNeal, supra note 25, at 701 (observing that kill lists “are vetted
through an elaborate bureaucratic process that allows for verification of
intelligence information before a person is added”). See generally Drone
Playbook, supra note 25.
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multiple agencies are involved in producing and analyzing the
intelligence supporting “nomination” and strikes decisions.375
These procedures require either unanimous approval from the
heads of several agencies or approval from the President, who
also must personally approve certain strike decisions.376 And
importantly, agencies insist that the targeting process does
include consideration of the more long-term costs and benefits its
critics accuse it of ignoring—the effect of the strike on U.S.
reputation, whether it will weaken or strengthen the enemy
groups, and the intelligence value of capturing the target
instead.377
However, these features of the process likely do little to
diminish the bureaucrats’ and contractors’ general incentives to
overregulate. Agencies “tend to choose the goals that are more
easily measured so they can demonstrate progress, . . . [and t]his
often means taking an approach that focuses on short-term
concerns with tangible outputs, as opposed to long-term effects
that might be harder to predict and quantify . . . .”378 In the
targeting process, “enemies killed in action” is as tangible an
output as they come. “Jackpots” and “touchdowns” are what the
bureaucracy wants to report to outsiders, not the careful
weighing of long-term foreign relations impacts.379 The long-term
objectives, such as the costs to U.S. reputation or blowback, are
much harder to measure and are therefore less likely to be
prioritized in the assessments leading up to a final strike
decision.

375. McNeal, supra note 25, at 701–29. See generally Drone Playbook, supra
note 25, § 3.
376. See Drone Playbook, supra note 25, §§ 2.E.1, 3.E.1, 3.E.2 (describing
the situations in which the President must make the ultimate decision whether
to approve lethal action against an individual).
377. See McNeal, supra note 25, at 724–25 (quoting the military doctrinal
requirements that must be weighed as a part of the “target validation
consideration” process).
378. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the
Department of Justice, supra note 36, at 310.
379. See supra notes 341–350 and accompanying text (discussing the remote
nature of drone strikes and the resulting lack of media attention); see also Reed,
supra note 347, at ix (noting the terminology used in drone strikes).
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Given the incentives and power dynamics in the targeting
regulatory process, then, it is quite doubtful that this robust
internal deliberative process—though designed with the best
intentions—has limited the overall momentum of the drone
program.380 The rational national security bureaucrat is more
likely, again, to change the means of regulation rather than
reduce its level.381 For example, there is evidence that the
number of personality strikes has dropped, but the number of
signature strikes, which do not require the same lengthy
deliberative process, has increased.382 It is more likely that such
reforms help legitimize the program by endowing it with the
empty vessel of “due process,” through which the same incentives
are ultimately channeled.383
2. The Other Players
As discussed above, the Congress and the public are
relatively weak institutional players with respect to national
security regulating because, in most situations, they lack the
information and expertise to evaluate its success.384 The
President possesses more power, but also faces some
disadvantages in grappling with the national security
bureaucracy.385 The courts have demonstrated the potential to
influence the regulatory process, but have rarely exercised that
influence.386 In addition, courts reviewing national security
decision-making, in the absence of countervailing influences, may
be vulnerable to capture by the agencies who are repeat players
before them.387
380. See Chesney, Who May Be Held?, supra note 191, at 804 (noting that
drone strikes have greatly increased over the last two years).
381. Supra note 326 and accompanying text.
382. See Jaffer, supra note 2, at 12–13 (describing the decision to expand a
form of signature strikes to Yemen in 2012).
383. Supra notes 212–213 and accompanying text.
384. Supra notes 254–258 and accompanying text.
385. Supra notes 259–261 and accompanying text.
386. Supra notes 369–383 and accompanying text.
387. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More
Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 67–68 (1991) (“[T]he same interest
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However, there are rare situations in which a clear national
security regulatory failure occurs that triggers increased pressure
on the bureaucracy from the President, Congress and the
public.388 The 9/11 attacks are the paradigmatic example of such a
failure, but in the wake of 9/11, even minor failures can have
enormous political effects.389 On Christmas Day, 2009, Umar
Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian with connections to al Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula, attempted to detonate plastic
explosives taped to his leg while on board a flight from
Amsterdam to Detroit.390 After his abortive attack, it emerged
that Abdulmutallab had been allowed to board the flight despite
being on the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE),
a database that gathers terrorism information from sensitive
military and intelligence sources around the world and is
managed by the National Counterterrorism Center.391 Admitting
that there had been a “systemic failure,” President Obama “gave
increased powers and responsibilities to the agencies that
nominate individuals to the [watch] lists, putting pressure on
them to add names.”392 Because Abdulmutallab had trained in
Yemen, Obama also halted detainee transfers of Yemenis from
Guantanamo, perhaps fearing the political disaster of a released

groups that have an organizational advantage in collecting resources to
influence legislators and agencies generally also have an organizational
advantage in collecting resources to influence the courts.”); Marc Galanter, Why
the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–104 (1974) (noting that repeat players have advantages
over parties that utilize the judiciary less frequently).
388. See DONOHUE, supra note 119, at 2 (describing the Executive Branch’s
typical response to a terrorist attack as (1) assuming that the government
lacked information that it could have used to thwart the preceding attack (2)
seeking an expansion of power).
389. See Anahad O’Connor & Eric Schmitt, Terror Attempt Seen as Man
Tries
to
Ignite
Device
on
Jet,
N.Y.
TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/26/us/26plane.html?mcubz=1 (last updated
Jan. 9, 2010) (last visited Nov. 13, 2017) (discussing a prevented terrorist attack
that spurred questions about plane security and the failures of the current
system) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
390. Id.
391. Id.; SCAHILL, supra note 25, at 18–20.
392. SCAHILL, supra note 25, at 20.
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detainee engaging in attacks.393 Congress, for its part, imposed
new, onerous restrictions on Guantanamo transfers.394
This example illustrates that the politics of national security,
when they become salient, also tend to make overregulation more
likely. In the absence of attacks, the public and Congress pay
relatively little attention to regulation of national security
activities.395 But when an attack occurs, or there is an increased
perception of threats, the renewed interest is expressed almost
exclusively in calls for more regulation.396 The President knows
this and acts accordingly, whipping the national security state to
regulate more aggressively.397
V. Reforming Warfare As Regulation
The warfare-as-regulation model of targeted killing reveals a
regulatory environment in which pro-regulatory forces are
incredibly strong and anti-regulatory forces are quite weak.398 It
is a significant challenge to formulate proposals that may
393. See White House: No Detainees to Yemen for Now, USA TODAY (Jan. 5,
2010), http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-01-05-Yemen_N.htm (last
visited Nov. 13, 2017) (justifying Obama’s decision to stop transfers out of
Yemen because of bipartisan political scrutiny resulting from fears of increased
terror activity amid prison releases in Yemen) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
394. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA & MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R42143, WARTIME DETENTION PROVISIONS IN RECENT DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION
LEGISLATION
(2016),
available
at
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42143.pdf (describing legislative restrictions on
releases of detainees from Guantanamo Bay).
395. Supra notes 255–258 and accompanying text.
396. DONOHUE, supra note 119, at 2 (observing that attacks almost always
spur efforts to increase national security authority).
397. See Rebecca Ingber, The Obama War Powers Legacy and the Internal
Forces that Entrench Executive Power, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 680, 686–87 (2016)
(“[A] president inclined to make aggressive claims of power may be more
willing . . . to circumvent some of the long-standing norms and institutional
features of the executive branch in order to consolidate political control for the
purpose of effectuating those executive power ends.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
398. The imbalance may not be as large in other areas of national security
regulation, such as domestic surveillance, where the American people may sense
that they are directly affected. See generally Rascoff, supra note 70, at 662–63.
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successfully compensate for this imbalance and the incentives to
overregulate it produces.399 But there is substantial value in
simply recognizing the existence and origins of this imbalance.400
Doing so should help reformers focus on the subset of possible
changes that are most likely to address the imbalance—the
institutional, doctrinal, and political tools that could, in this
context, have an anti-regulatory effect.401
Scholars have grappled with a similar imbalance in criminal
justice regulation and some of their reform proposals are
applicable to, or have already been proposed for, the targeted
killing context.402 In other ways, however, the targeted killing
process—and national security regulating more generally—
presents unique challenges that require emphasizing different
tools.403 Reform proposals tend to fall into three categories—
(1) institutional reforms, such as separating functions within an
agency or the reassignment of potentially conflicting missions to
different agencies; (2) accountability mechanisms, such as
external or internal review; and (3) political engagement, such as
lobbying efforts or providing lawmakers, the President, and the
public with information that may soften their pro-regulatory
views.404
A. Institutional Changes
Because national security bureaucrats operate within a
context in which their incentives point in the direction of
overregulation, altering that context through institutional reform
is one potentially effective way of altering the incentives the
context creates. In the criminal justice realm, Professor Rachel
Barkow has proposed that the incentives for prosecutors to
399. See supra Part IV (describing the incentives that lead to the
imbalance).
400. See supra Part III.B. (describing the benefits of the warfare-asregulation paradigm).
401. See infra Parts V.A–C (discussing these possible changes).
402. Infra notes 412–417 and accompanying text.
403. Id.
404. Supra Parts IV.A–C.
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overregulate can be mitigated through internal separation of
functions within agencies—specifically, that prosecutors “who
make investigative and advocacy decisions should be separated
from those who make adjudicative decisions.”405 Barkow also
observed that the Department of Justice’s “tough-on-crime”
mission influences and distorts its clemency, forensics, and
corrections decisions.406 The most effective institutional reform,
Barkow argues, would be re-assigning these functions to other
agencies or creating new independent agencies to carry them
out.407
The targeted killing process is enshrouded in secrecy, but it
is characterized, to some extent, by separation of functions within
agencies and the assignment of different tasks to different
agencies. Many agencies may be involved in gathering
intelligence on a single person.408 The NSA provides the “signals
intelligence”—e.g., tracking targets’ locations through phone
numbers and SIM cards—while the CIA and military intelligence
agencies are more likely to provide human intelligence.409 Joint
Special Operations Command (within DOD) and the CIA (the
“operating agencies”) conduct the strikes with the assistance of
private contractors.410 This division of labor does avoid proregulatory incentives that would exist if one agency official both
collected intelligence on an individual and approved the strike

405. Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 874 (2009) [hereinafter
Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from
Administrative Law].
406. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the
Department of Justice, supra note 36, at 277–78.
407. See id. at 334–35 (suggesting the formation of direct lines of
communication with Congress and the media without requiring approval from
the Department of Justice would better secure political support); see also Jon D.
Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515,
520 (2015) (“[T]he constitutional tradition of employing rivalrous institutional
counterweights to promote good governance, political accountability, and
compliance with the rule of law.”).
408. See generally McNeal, supra note 25, at 701–30.
409. Id.; see SCAHILL, supra note 25, at 22–40 (arguing that the lists relied
on in assessing individuals are over-inclusive).
410. See generally McNeal, supra note 25, at 730–48.
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decision—or even if a single agency conducted the process from
start to finish.411
The nomination and approval process also culminates in
inter-agency review designed to include high-level input and
perspectives from several different agencies, any of which may
nominate an individual for targeting—the “nominating
agencies.”412 The NCTC coordinates information on nominees,
which it organizes and presents to a “deputies committee” made
up of the seconds-in-command at the DOJ and the major agencies
within the national security state.413 The nominee can be subject
to a strike only after consideration by a “principals committee” of
nominating agencies and other officials on the National Security
Council.414 If the principals are unanimous, the nominee is added
to the kill list.415 The President must approve an addition to the
list when the principals committee is not unanimous or the target
is a U.S. citizen.416 Personality strikes are executed by either the
DOD’s Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), the CIA, or
the two in combination—with government personnel working
alongside private contractors.417
However, there are several reasons why these features are
not likely to constrain the over-regulatory dynamics. They have
little potential to alter bureaucratic incentives.418 Checks and
balances are “mechanisms designed to prevent action that
411. The CIA’s drone program may be characterized by this problem,
however, when the agency gathers most of the intelligence for strikes that it
also executes. Id. at 707–08.
412. These agencies include the State Department, the Treasury, the
Defense Department, the Justice Department, the Department of Homeland
Security, the CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Counterterrorism
Center. See generally Drone Playbook, supra note 25, §§ 19, 3.D.
413. These agencies are the Department of State, DOD, JCS, DOJ, DHS,
DNI, CIA, and NCTC. Id. § 3.D.2.
414. Id. § 3.D. The officials at lower levels need not be unanimous for a
nominee to be forwarded to the principals. See generally McNeal, supra note 25,
at 727.
415. Drone Playbook, supra note 25, § 3.E.1.
416. Id. § 3.E.2.
417. COCKBURN, supra note 27, at 32.
418. See supra Part III.D (discussing incentives among key players in the
drone regulatory scheme).
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oversteps legitimate boundaries by requiring the cooperation of
actors with different institutional interests to produce an
authoritative decision.”419 Of the principals who ultimately
approve a decision to add a name to the kill list, only the State
and Treasury Secretaries head agencies that do not have
counterterrorism as their primary institutional missions.420 But
their involvement in the process is unlikely to be influential in
most cases.421 These agencies do not typically collect intelligence,
and the intelligence on the kill list nominees is compiled and
presented by a single agency, the NCTC.422 In other words, the
State and Treasury Secretaries must generally rely only on other
agencies’ presentation of the facts in making a decision.423 And in
deliberations on whether to add a name to the kill list,
prospective voices of dissent from Treasury or State, if they exist,
are likely to be overwhelmed by the others’.424
Indeed, the separation of functions in a multi-stage process
involving intelligence gathering can actually create new
pro-regulatory incentives. Those who ultimately approve targets
and those who conduct the targeting operations must make
life-and-death decisions based on intelligence they did not gather
and are not well-positioned to evaluate.425 They face strong
incentives to suppress doubts about the strength of that
intelligence.426
419. Grant & Keohane, supra note 1032, at 30 (emphasis added).
420. McNeal, supra note 25, at 693.
421. See id. at 728–29 (describing legal advisors and the NCTC as two of the
more influential players in the decision-making process).
422. See id. at 727 (describing the NCTC’s role as scrutinizing the names
that come to it and ensuring the names on the list meet applicable standards
before the list proceeds to the next step).
423. See id. (noting that some senior level bureaucrats will abstain from
voting on whom should be added to a target list because these individuals “‘do
not have independent information or have not made an independent
assessment’ of the target”).
424. See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 86–87 (noting the unanimity of views
among bureaucrats in the Defense and State Departments).
425. See SCAHILL, supra note 25, at 99 (observing that the process is “highly
compartmentalized” and that “drone operators taking shots at targets on the
ground have little idea where the intelligence is coming from”).
426. See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 86–87 (describing an expectation that
group members express loyalty to group decisions).
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B. Review Mechanisms and Doctrinal Changes
The establishment of a review mechanism is another way
incentives to over-regulate could potentially be dampened, by
requiring the agencies involved in the targeted killing process to
be held accountable for decision-making and its results.
Numerous proposals have been made, including some form of
judicial,427 inter-agency,428 congressional,429 or intra-agency
review.430
A truly independent review mechanism could have value, but
not necessarily in the way these reform proposals suggest.431 It is
important, of course, to promote accountability, compliance with
rules, and genuine deliberation.432 But the greatest value of these
mechanisms as applied to national security activities lies in the
brute anti-regulatory pressure they exert on over-regulating
bureaucrats.433

427. See, e.g., Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and
Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 440, 446 (2009)
(proposing Bivens-style judicial review of targeting operations); Stephen
Vladeck, Targeted Killing and Judicial Review, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
ARGUENDO 11, 26 (2014) (proposing, as the “least-worst [procedural] solution,”
an ex post judicial remedy created by Congress similar to the cause of action
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act).
428. See, e.g., Neal K. Katyal, Opinion, Who Will Mind the Drones?, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2013, at A27 (proposing a review panel made up primarily of
national security advisors).
429. Cf. McNeal, supra note 25, at 790 (proposing that Congress create
an independent review board . . . [appointed] by the minority and
majority leadership of the House and Senate . . . drawn from the
ranks of former intelligence and military officers . . . [and] responsible
for publishing an annual report analyzing how well the government's
targeted killing program is performing.
430. See Crandall, If You Can’t Beat Them, Kill Them: Complex Adaptive
Systems Theory and the Rise in Targeted Killing, supra note 73, at 626
(proposing the use of CSRT-type proceedings); see also Radsan & Murphy, supra
note 38, at 1230 (proposing an internal review process within the CIA for its
targeting operations); see also Craig, supra note 209, at 2353 (listing recent
proposals to reform the targeted killing process).
431. See Radsan & Murphy, supra note 38, at 1208 (suggesting independent
reviews that are “as public as national security permits”).
432. Id.
433. Supra notes 427–430 and accompanying text.

2034

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1953 (2017)

Given the incentives that drive agency, presidential, and
congressional decision-making in the national security realm,434 it
is unlikely that more frequent congressional or intra-agency
review would exert anti-regulatory pressure on those agencies
conducting targeted killing operations. As discussed above,
interagency review—which already exists—is unlikely to be
successful unless the reviewing agency has both a different
mission than the agencies conducting targeting operations and
the resources and expertise to evaluate targeting decisions.435 No
such agency currently exists,436 but an OIRA437-type entity
empowered to review national security bureaucratic decisionmaking—at least the rules that govern targeting decisions and
their costs and benefits, if not the individualized
determinations—could potentially alter bureaucratic behavior if
it employed a strong cost-benefit analysis requirement borrowed
from Executive Order 12,866.438 OIRA review was conceived as an
anti-regulatory device, and has in fact slowed down the pace of
rulemaking in the domestic context.439
The Executive Order requires agencies to submit proposed
rules to OIRA and include a cost-benefit analysis of the rule.440
434. See supra Part III.B (listing the key players in the drone decisionmaking process).
435. Supra note 36 and accompanying text.
436. See Rascoff, supra note 70, at 657–58 (noting that “quasi-independent”
intelligence oversight boards lack resources and are riven by political
disagreements). See generally Schlanger, supra note 21, at 166.
437. Executive Order 12,866, which establishes, over all U.S. government
agency rulemaking, centralized review by the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
echoes the APA by exempting “[r]egulations or rules that pertain to a military or
foreign affairs function of the United States, other than procurement
regulations.” Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993), reprinted as
amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2012).
438. See Rascoff, supra note 70, at 674 (discussing the potential
effectiveness of OIRA-type review of intelligence-gathering). See generally Exec.
Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(2012).
439. See generally Bagley & Revesz, supra note 300 (analyzing the
centralized review of agency rulemaking resulting from a mistaken assumption
that domestic agencies tend to overregulate).
440. Supra note 437, § 3(f).
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For “significant regulatory actions,” however, the Executive
Order requires much more. The agency must submit not only a
cost-benefit analysis of the proposed action, but it also must
consider and provide cost-benefit analyses of “potentially effective
and reasonably feasible alternatives to the proposed action,”
including taking no regulatory action at all.441 In the targeted
killing context, the application of these principles would require
the drone bureaucracy to consider, and demonstrate to the
reviewing body that it had in fact considered, the benefits of
taking no action, other means of neutralizing a proposed target,
including capture, and the intelligence value that the target could
provide if detained and interrogated.442
Judicial review of targeting decisions—either ex ante or ex
post—has strong anti-regulatory potential, even in the national
security realm.443 But aside from the military detention context,
the judiciary’s capacity to influence regulation by the national
security bureaucracy has been overshadowed by its reluctance to
do so.444 The courts have so far rejected plaintiffs’ attempts to
introduce judicial scrutiny into the targeting process either ex
ante or ex post: they have declined to review kill list nominations
or consider claims for damages after a strike.445
441. Id. § 6(a).
442. According to the Drone Playbook, these factors are already part of the
interagency process for targeted killing nominations and approval. Drone
Playbook, supra note 25, §§ 1C, 2, 3B. See also McNeal, supra note 25, at 701,
730 (confirming this from interviews). But there are reasons to doubt how
seriously, in practice, the detention option is considered. See SCAHILL, supra
note 25, at 63 (noting that the
slide illustrating the chain of approval makes no mention of
evaluating option for capture. It may be implied that those
discussions are part of the target development process, but the
omission reflects the brute facts beneath the Obama administration’s
state preference for capture” and that “detention of marked targets is
now incredibly rare.
443. Supra Part II.C.
444. See Craig, supra note 209, at 2364–68 (expressing skepticism about the
effectiveness of judicial review of targeting decisions in light of the highly
deferential approach to Guantanamo habeas cases in the D.C. Circuit); Jenny S.
Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV.
1013, 1017 (2008) (observing that U.S. courts’ involvement in national security
cases has focused heavily on procedural issues “at a human cost”).
445. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2010) (rejecting—
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As a way of addressing concerns about Article III courts
lacking the competence or willingness to evaluate targeted killing
decisions, scholars have proposed that a special court or
quasi-adjudicative body be established to take on the task.446
Whatever the forum, however, altering bureaucratic behavior
requires that the reviewing body impose greater scrutiny on the
decision-making process.447 As in the criminal justice context,448
review of targeted killing decisions would have a greater chance
of altering bureaucratic behavior if it applied administrative law
principles, such as hard look, that are recognized as having an
anti-regulatory effect. Courts use the hard-look doctrine to test
the legitimacy of agency action by scrutinizing the agency’s
reasoning—asking whether there is a rational connection
between the facts found and the policy choice made.449
However, given the frequent use of post-hoc intelligence
gathering to justify strikes, reviewing bodies should do more. The
hard-look doctrine works best when paired with a second
principle, the Chenery doctrine.450 Chenery requires that an
on standing, political question, and other justiciability grounds—a challenge to
the nomination of a U.S. citizen to the “kill list” without first allowing the
plaintiff any judicial process); El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607
F.3d 836, 837–38 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (upholding dismissal, on political question
grounds, of a suit by owners of a Sudanese pharmaceutical destroyed in a
targeting operation for “unjustifiably destroying the plant, failing to compensate
them for its destruction, and defaming them by asserting they had ties to
Osama bin Laden”).
446. See Craig, supra note 209, at 2378–83 (discussing proposals).
447. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons
from Administrative Law, supra note 405, at 893–94.
448. Id. at 871.
449. The APA requires reviewing courts to “hold unlawful and set aside
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)
(1947). The Supreme Court has interpreted “arbitrary and capricious” review as
requiring courts to review the record and “satisfy themselves that the agency
has made a reasoned decision based on its evaluation of the significance—or
lack of significance—of . . . information.” Marsh v. Oregon Nat. Res. Council, 490
U.S. 360, 378 (1989). “Hard look” review describes the way the courts enforce
the “arbitrary and capricious” standard, so the terms are usually considered
interchangeable. See generally Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics
in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 5 (2009).
450. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94–95 (1943).
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agency defend its policy only on the grounds articulated by the
agency when the policy was developed.451 The hard-look Chenery
combination would prevent the drone bureaucracy from seeking
post-hoc justifications for strikes that killed disproportionate
numbers of civilians or failed to kill the enemy at all.452
Like OIRA review, Chenery and hard-look have been
criticized for having an anti-regulatory bias and imposing
significant costs on agency decision-making.453 However, what is
viewed by many as a liability in the domestic context becomes an
asset in the national security context.454 Because the power
dynamics and incentives push the drone bureaucracy to overregulate—to conduct too many strikes based on insufficient
intelligence—doctrines that impose more regulatory costs on the
drone bureaucracy are necessary to push it back toward the
optimal level of regulation.455
C. Political Pressure
As I discussed above, national security bureaucrats face
relatively little political pressure, under ordinary circumstances,
to reduce the level of regulation. Their greatest concern, in fact, is
that the public and Congress will view them as
451. Id.; see, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of
Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 958–59 (2007) (“[A] reviewing court may uphold an
agency’s action only on the grounds upon which the agency relied when it
acted.”).
452. Supra notes 364–365 and accompanying text. Professors Radsan and
Murphy have proposed the application of these principles to internal review of
CIA drones strikes. See generally Radsan & Murphy, supra note 38, at 1234.
However, for reasons discussed above, use of these principles in an internal
review process is unlikely to have a meaningful anti-regulatory effect given the
CIA’s institutional mission and bureaucratic incentives. Supra notes 310–330
and accompanying text.
453. See, e.g., Ganesh Sitaraman, Foreign Hard Look Review, 66 ADMIN. L.
REV. 489, 501 (2014) (discussing the popularity of the idea “that hard look
review had contributed to a slowing, even ‘ossification,’ of agency action”).
454. Id. at 513.
455. Cf. Laurence Tai, Harnessing Industry Influence, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 1
(2016) (proposing that capture may be “harnessed” by “making regulation
preliminarily biased against industry, with the aim of ultimately unbiased
policy as industry influences policy to cancel out the initial bias”).
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underregulating.456 Nonetheless, the same trends that have made
the warfare-as-regulation paradigm viable—the expanding scope
of national security activities, the changing nature of warfare,
and the declining half-life of secrets457—also create new
possibilities for exerting anti-regulatory political pressure on the
national security bureaucracy.
The Snowden revelations demonstrated that there exists a
genuine potential for domestic public backlash against
overregulation by the national security state.458 Although public
support for NSA surveillance actually spiked immediately after
the Snowden revelations, support slowly ebbed as the public
absorbed the details about the scope and intrusiveness of the
surveillance.459 Similarly, in January 2017 an aggressively
implemented executive order banning entry for non-citizens from
seven Muslim-majority countries led to public outrage,
demonstrations at airports throughout the United States, and
swift judicial intervention to block it.460 In addition, the public
has periodically demonstrated concern about overspending and
inefficiency in the national security state.461 More transparency
456. Supra notes 329–330 and accompanying text.
457. See supra Part II (discussing the trends that make the
warfare-as-regulation paradigm a useful project).
458. See Mark Mazzetti & Michael S. Schmidt, Ex-Worker at C.I.A. Says He
Leaked Data on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2013, at A1 (examining
Snowden’s leak of large amounts of classified information, and the reaction the
leaks caused in Washington); Rascoff, supra note 70, at 642 (discussing how the
Snowden leaks caused the President to reshape his outlook on intelligence
gathering).
459. See Dalal, supra note 99, at 113 (detailing the public outrage after the
Snowden scandal).
460. See Colin Dwyer, Of Courts And Confusion: Here's The Reaction To
Trump’s Immigration Freeze, NPR (Jan. 29, 2017, 9:17 AM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/01/29/512272524/of-courts-andconfusion-heres-the-reaction-to-trumps-immigration-freeze (last visited Nov. 13,
2017) (describing the protests and political backlash that occurred after Trump’s
immigration freeze); Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1169 (9th Cir. 2017)
(per curiam) (denying the U.S. government’s emergency motion for stay pending
appeal of the district court’s nationwide injunction halting enforcement of
Trump’s executive order banning entry into the United States of individuals
from seven Muslim-majority countries).
461. See Jeanne Sahadi, Why Debt is a Threat to the National Security, CNN
(October
22,
2012,
11:24
PM),
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about the costs of the drone program could create pressure to
scale back its scope.462
However, perhaps the most underappreciated opportunities
for domestic anti-regulatory pressure involve the private firms
that the national security state depends on to regulate. As I
discussed above, private firms have traditionally shared the
national security bureaucrat’s pro-regulatory incentives, which
the profit motive tends to enhance.463 Nonetheless, the profit
motive can exert anti-regulatory pressure, too. This is most likely
to happen when a firm supplies both the national security
bureaucracy and the consumer market, and when its national
security activities are exposed to public scrutiny.464 The Snowden
revelations caused previously quiescent telecommunications and
high technology companies to be less cooperative in collection
activities and to begin lobbying the President and Congress to
scale back the scope of NSA surveillance.465
Intelligence collection is a significant component of the
targeted killing process, so U.S. consumer pressure on the private
firms that assist in the collection process could, or perhaps
already
has,
produce
anti-regulatory
effects.466
But,
anti-regulatory pressure could also result from the expansion of

http://money.cnn.com/2012/10/22/news/economy/national-securitydebt/index.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2017) (“The concern: If the debt continues
to grow unbridled, the U.S. government will be constrained in its ability to pay
for what it wants to do militarily and diplomatically.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
462. See McNeal, supra note 25, at 788 (noting that publishing the costs
associated with government activity is a proven accountability technique).
463. See supra notes 292–325 and accompanying text (discussing private
contractors’ incentives when working with national security bureaucrats).
464. See Rascoff, supra note 70, at 662 (describing the shift in technology
firms’ regulatory incentives after the Snowden revelations because of the firms’
worry about the “reputational and economic harms that could result from being
identified with the putative misdeeds of the NSA”).
465. See Rascoff, supra note 70, at 660–66 (detailing the ways in which the
Snowden revelations changed the incentives of technology companies).
466. See Michael R. Siebecker, Bridging Troubled Waters: Linking Corporate
Efficiency and Political Legitimacy Through a Discourse Theory of the Firm, 75
OHIO ST. L.J. 103, 104–05 (2014) (demonstrating how investor, shareholder, and
consumer concerns can affect a company’s corporate governance actions).

2040

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1953 (2017)

the drone market to the domestic realm.467 Firms that supply
drones to the military and law enforcement will also be supplying
a significant chunk of the sales and maintenance for commercial
and private use.468 This fundamentally alters these private firms’
incentives and increases their power while reducing the
government’s.469 Moreover, like voracious personal data
collection, when drones are a ubiquitous tool for not only warfare,
but also commercial and personal use, it will be easier for the
public to see the costs they impose.470
The potential for increased anti-regulatory pressure extends
to the global level, from both private firms and foreign
governments.471 As a dominant military and economic power, the
467. See Troy A. Rule, Drone Zoning, 95 N.C. L. REV. 133, 137–38 (2016)
(describing the civilian drone industry as serving “one of the most rapidly
expanding markets in the world” and noting that the markets “for both
recreational and commercial drones are expanding at breakneck pace”);
COCKBURN, supra note 27, at 178–79 (describing the influence of the
“increasingly potent drone lobby”).
468. See Peter W. Singer, The Predator Comes Home: A Primer on Domestic
Drones, their Huge Business Opportunities, and their Deep Political, Moral, and
Legal Challenges, BROOKINGS (Mar. 8, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/
research/the-predator-comes-home-a-primer-on-domestic-drones-their-hugebusiness-opportunities-and-their-deep-political-moral-and-legal-challenges/ (last
visited Dec. 7, 2017)
[I]f you are a maker of small tactical surveillance drones in the U.S.
right now, your client pool numbers effectively one: the U.S. military.
But when the airspace opens up, you will have as many as 21,000
new clients—all the state and local police agencies that either have
expensive manned aviation departments or can’t afford them.”
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
469. See id. (predicting what will happen when manufacturers have a wider
set of clients than just the government).
470. See The Future of Unmanned Aviation in the U.S. Economy: Safety and
Privacy Considerations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and
Transp., 113th Cong. 24–25 (2014) (statement of Christopher Calabrese,
Legislative Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union) (describing, among other
concerns, potential privacy invasions from domestic drone use); Rule, supra note
467, at 137–39 (highlighting the growth of the civilian drone industry, and its
effects on the growing number of conflicts between drone operators and
landowners); INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS & CONFLICT RESOLUTION CLINIC, supra note
289, at 77–79 (describing how surveillance by drones caused property damage
and economic hardship on communities in Pakistan).
471. See Grant & Keohane, supra note 102, at 37 (listing peer accountability
and public reputational accountability as two means of regulatory accountability
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U.S. remains largely resistant to many forms of global
accountability for its activities.472 But the potential cleavages
between military contractors and the national security
bureaucrats could play out internationally: those firms supply
drone equipment to other governments and will also supply them
for non-military uses worldwide.473
In addition, U.S. government policy can be affected by
reputational concerns and pressure from foreign governments.474
Some U.S. allies have refused to extradite accused terrorists to
the U.S. in light of the revelations about abusive interrogation
practices during the Bush Administration and due process flaws
in the military commissions at Guantanamo.475 Moreover, the
U.S. national security state’s intelligence collection activities
extend, not only to foreign citizens, but to their governments as
well—including the governments of influential allies.476
Revelations about surveillance of European allied governments
pressured the Obama Administration to scale back its
surveillance, and even its human intelligence gathering, in
Europe.477 Some foreign governments have even avoided U.S.
technology firms when awarding important contracts due to
mechanisms).
472. See id. at 39 (observing that because “large and powerful states” like
the U.S. “do not depend on subventions from others or on markets, and there is
no strong international legal structure governing their actions . . . such states
often resist international legal accountability”).
473. See id. at 37 (“Overlapping . . . interest areas may require actors to
compromise with one another to secure the cooperation necessary to define or
implement policy.”).
474. See id. (describing accountability that arises as a result of reputational
concerns and peer pressure).
475. See Background on Guantanamo Bay Prison, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST
(Jan.
20,
2017),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/backgroundguantanamo-bay-prison (last visited Nov. 13, 2017) (“Because of the
questionable legitimacy of the Guantanamo military commissions and the
human rights concerns over indefinite detention at the prison, countries have
refused to extradite terrorism suspects to the United States . . . .”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
476. See Rascoff, supra note 70, at 665–66 (discussing pushback from
European allies on U.S. surveillance practices, including surveillance of heads of
state).
477. See id. (discussing pushback from European allies on U.S. surveillance
practices).
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concerns about the firms’ cooperation in U.S. surveillance.478 This
has thrown those firms’ and the national security bureaucrats’
incentives further out of alignment.479
Finally, it is possible that changing political dynamics and
the costs of drone strikes could cause the governments in the
countries where targeting occurs to exert significant antiregulatory pressure. After botched operations in 2014, the Yemen
government temporarily withdrew permission for further drone
attacks.480 Again in February 2017, Yemen withdrew permission
for further U.S. ground operations in the country after a U.S. raid
killed a number of civilians.481
In the end, there is no single solution to the massive power
imbalance in favor of pro-regulatory forces in the targeted killing
process and in national security regulating in general. What is
most likely to be effective in addressing this power imbalance is a
combination of anti-regulatory pressures: the willingness of an
independent review body to apply the same scrutiny to national
security regulating that it applies to domestic regulation,
consumer activism aimed at private firms, and retaliation from
foreign governments. These efforts, alongside the efforts by NGOs
to force transparency about targeted killing and the efforts, can
reinforce one another in the same way that pro-regulatory forces
have.
VI. Conclusion
The national security state occupies a central role in
American governance. Its interventions in the private lives of
both citizens and non-citizens will only grow as the boundaries

478. See id. at 663 (observing how the recent Snowden revelations caused
the German government to transfer an important contract from Verizon to
Duetsche Telecom).
479. See id. at 664 (detailing how American firms have “taken a stance
against ‘overregulation’ by the intelligence state”).
480. David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Yemen Withdraws Permission for U.S.
Antiterror Ground Missions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2017, at A1.
481. Id.
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between the foreign and domestic realms, and between military
and law enforcement functions, continue to erode.
Yet state’s activities have been viewed, for too long, as
existing somehow outside the bureaucracy that regulates
American life. The national security state is treated as the war
machine—a leviathan, which advocates of stronger rightsprotective legal regimes seek to reign in, to oversee, and to
regulate. Advocates of rights-focused legal regimes have been
effective in many ways, but without a model of how national
security bureaucrats actually regulate, analyses of those
bureaucrats’ activities are incomplete and may misidentify the
source of key problems.
This Article begins the project of modeling national security
activities as regulation. This model is a simple one and can and
should be complicated by future assessments that move beyond
classic public choice assumptions and address other specific
national security activities. However, this model does reveal that
the most important driver of agency behavior in the national
security state—in the targeted killing context, at least—are
bureaucrats’ incentives. From this insight it follows that the most
effective means of influencing the regulating national security
bureaucracy is to find ways to alter bureaucrats’ incentives. This
is a promising place for reformers to focus their attention.

